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Interview with Shlomi Daskal

Where are you from and how did you start doing this work?

I’m from Hadera1 originally. I’ve always been interested in Arabic. I don’t know why but I loved it from an early age, and planned to major in it in high school. My high school’s department of Middle Eastern studies wasn’t the most successful, so I didn’t do that. I studied other subjects: mathematics, physics, chemistry, things like that. Before the army, I went to study Arabic at Givat Haviva.2 They used to have a one-year program which no longer exists, a year that was considered a pre-military program. It was only Arabic language studies. That’s how I started out. That’s where the connection began. After high school I did my B.A in Arabic and then a Masters. During that period I met all kinds of people. One of them was Matti Steinberg. He was Ami Ayalon’s3 advisor during the period he was head of the GSS.4 That was two and a half years ago, July 2002. He said, “Listen, Ami is working on a project, come join us, try it out.“ That’s how I joined The People’s Voice.5

Was this the first time you were involved in joint work?

It was the first project I took part in officially. I did other things prior to that but they don’t count. It was the first project I really participated in.

You said that you don’t know what sparked your interest in Arabic, what do you think in retrospect?

I was always told at home how important it is to speak that language. My grandparents spoke European languages because they were European and that’s what was appropriate for the place. Arabic is the relevant language for this region, so my family was always very encouraging. Why me? I don’t know. I remember it as being something I was always drawn to because it seemed interesting.

Please explain the project and your work.

The project is a civilian, joint Israel-Palestinian initiative that is an attempt to achieve peace. The initiative states a very simple thing. All the former initiatives failed for a simple reason, because we never set a target. For the first time we’re saying that we aim to arrive at a certain place. The document includes six principles. It was drafted by Israelis and Palestinians together, not by only one side. It is based on six ideas: two states for two peoples, accepting the pre-’67 borders6 and evacuating settlements,7 Jerusalem8 as a free city; Palestinian neighborhoods will be governed by Palestinian rule and Jewish neighborhoods will be governed by Israel. The right of return will apply only to the Palestinian state, just as Jews will have the right of return to Israel.9 The Palestinian state will be a demilitarized zone. After all this happens comes the sixth clause, which pronounces the conflict over and the mutual claims fulfilled.

Our next step is to prove that this move will have the public’s support, now that we’ve drafted the proposal. We travel all over the country; the Palestinians do the same throughout Judea and Samaria,10 the West Bank11 and the Gaza Strip.12 We offer the petition13 to people and give them the option to sign it, which signifies, “Yes, that’s where I want to go.” The goal is to create pressure that will come from underneath and will force the leaders to negotiate and to arrive at the red lines we’ve drawn up. My job is to coordinate with the Palestinian side. I report on what’s happening on our side and receive updates regarding their activities. I follow the Palestinian media, websites, and check their responses to the initiative. I’m responsible for our volunteer programs all over Israel.

Do you also participate in gathering signatures?

Of course, that’s part of my job. For example, we were in different cities every Friday last summer. We would arrive, kick up a commotion, put up our stall and get people to sign. We encounter hardly any opposition. The problem is that people are apathetic, they have no faith. People say, “We don’t have the power to change things, only the politicians do.” We’re saying that’s not true. If we create the right type of pressure the change will occur.

What’s the most difficult part of this project?

The most difficult thing is to convince the Israelis that there is a Palestinian partner. That’s the most difficult thing. They don’t believe it because there’s a problem: The media in Israel airs only negative things, just as I see the Palestinian media covering a lot of negative affairs here. I believe that the Palestinian and Israeli societies are a mirror image of each other and that identical processes are taking place in both societies. They can’t believe there’s an Israeli partner and we can’t believe there’s a Palestinian partner. That’s why convincing them that there’s a Palestinian partner is the most difficult thing.

How can you convince people that “there is a partner” on the other side?

We present the fact that we collected 160,000 Palestinian signatures, and those are not from the intelligentsia. We’re talking hard-core Fatah,14 people who served prison sentences in Israel, people who have paid a price for resistance and for their past actions. They’re saying, “We tried one way but it failed.” It’s important to remember that peace is the default option for both sides. At first each side tried to hurt each other. That didn’t work, now we must go on to the other option: peace. The other strategy, and it’s very difficult, is showing the other side. For example, we created movies about our meetings with the Palestinians for our website. I edited them. We did that so people could see it through photos and video clips. Our problem is that our Palestinian partners have what we call in Hebrew a “problematic security background,” meaning ex-convicts, problematic people who aren’t allowed into Israel.15 My dream is to bring fifty of them to visit Tel-Aviv. But that won’t happen, ever! So we attempt to create meetings.

Do Palestinian Israelis16 also sign the agreement?

Israeli Arabs sign as Israelis. It’s interesting that since I’ve worked a lot with Israeli Arabs and every time I've spokes about this initiative I've been tempted to address them as “Palestinians who are Israeli citizens.“ They said, “Sir! We’re Israeli citizens!”17 Clearly they sign on the Israeli side. By the way, what happens with the Israeli-Arabs is happening to the Jews here as well: apathy, weariness, and wariness. This all stems from what we’ve been through in the past decade.

How come Arab Israelis sign on the Israeli side?

We see Israeli Arabs as Israeli citizens. They see themselves as Israeli citizens. That’s why they sign on the Israeli side. Our rules state that every Israeli citizen who is 16 years old--who will have the right to vote in the upcoming Israeli elections in November 2006--is allowed to sign. Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem, although carrying a blue i.d. card, are not allowed to participate in the general election, only in the local/municipal elections.18 That is why they don’t sign on our side. In fact, they sign our initiative on the Palestinian side.

Getting back to the 160,000 signatures-that’s still only signatures, what do you think the impact can be?

When we started out, many wise people and experts told us it wouldn’t work and that we wouldn’t collect 100 signatures. A well-known persona said to me that he’d cut off his hand if we collected 1,000 signatures. We currently have 160,000 signatures. That is powerful. I agree that it’s but a drop in the sea. There’s a beautiful poem in Hebrew about one drop and another drop, how they become an ocean. We’ll get there ultimately. We need to be patient; the pressure will build up. The figure we have, 160,000 Palestinians, is very impressive to me. We expected the ratio would be 1:2 or 1:3, two or three Israeli signatures for every Palestinian signature. It seems not to be the case. Their interest and their willingness to operate are much greater than on the Israeli side. Another comment on the subject - the requirements for signing the document are fairly complex. You must give your name, ID number and a phone number. For the Palestinians divulging so much information is risky.

Why is it risky for Palestinians to divulge that information-their ID number and phone number?

It’s not risky, but people are wary of it. It’s not a good thing to do; one never knows where the information will go. Consider the fact that the head of the Israeli side is the former director of the GSS!19 Palestinians are afraid of this sort of thing, given the years that Israel has been controlling the Territories,20 and it is suspect to them.

I can tell you a story about one of our most dedicated Palestinian activists in Ramallah.21 He went to lecture in Tulkarm.22 He served a few years’ prison sentence in Israel in the past. As he was leaving Ramallah, he was detained at a checkpoint. Even though we arranged all the permits he was still detained. We pressured the authorities to have him released. He continued to Tulkarm and was detained again. From a Palestinian state of mind, that must be a plot or conspiracy. He couldn’t be detained twice just like that. It must be the Director of the GSS, he must have arranged this, he doesn’t agree with it. Once a brother of one of our Palestinian activists, who was high on the ’wanted’ list23 was later assassinated by Israel. The activist wouldn’t talk to me for a while because he claimed that he was being followed because he was talking to me. So it is difficult. But 160,000 is a very large number and that’s important.

I noticed that people can sign the petition via your website, even people from abroad. How does that work?

Only if a person has an Israeli ID card. That’s one of our main problems. The only system of ensuring the person who signed is who he or she claims to be, and to avoid multiple signatures, is by using the ID number. We tried all sorts of other methods and understood it’s the only way. Many people have said, I won’t disclose my ID number, it’s justified, but…

Why would Israelis be reluctant to give out their identity card numbers?

Giving your ID number out on the Internet is a little risky; it’s problematic information. If someone were to come up to me on the street and say, “do you support peace? Yes, come sign,” I’m not sure I would. I’d want to see what it was, and that’s a problem. It’s an even bigger problem, like I said earlier, with the Palestinians. It’s problematic giving so much information.

Who are the people that collect signatures?

People like you and me, there are all kinds. On the Israeli side we have many volunteers coming from all over the country. I know our volunteers personally; I traveled all over in order to organize the volunteers. Here in Jerusalem we have someone who has a Ph.D. in Neuroscience and is writing his post-doc at Harvard. He’s in Israel now and every Friday that he’s in Jerusalem he collects signatures. That’s one example. We also have high school kids, students. On the Palestinian side it’s a little different. There are many volunteers there, too, but people are cut off because of the wall24 and the checkpoints.25 Every district works autonomously, from a regional office. The program director, I’m not sure that’s what they call it, is responsible for gathering signatures. That’s the difference.

What is the effect of the head of the Israeli side being the former director of the GSS? Is it important?

Unfortunately it’s very important! It’s very important because in Israel the state of affairs is still one in which people believe the former director of the GSS more than an academic or a professor at the university. To put it more colloquially, you might say that a person tends to have more credibility as a peacemaker if they have a record showing they killed Arabs in the past [laughs]. It’s very sad but that’s how things are. Interestingly enough, the Palestinian side also prefers this type of candidate. First of all, if you compare him [Ayalon] to Yossi Beilin,26 while Yossi Beilin is appreciated, it is agreed that Yossi Beilin could never receive the support that Ami Ayalon will, on account of his resume. Palestinian society views people who fought in the past and are now peacemakers as being honorable; it’s something that can be appreciated. That was the case with Rabin,27 as well as with Barak28 at the beginning. That’s why it is important.

Sari Nusseibeh29 comes from academia, how is that effective?

Like I said, the Palestinian side operates differently. They use the chaos in the PA30 and in Fatah, which was the central structure and is now collapsing, has collapsed. They duplicated Fatah’s mechanisms and they work according to it. Although Nusseibeh is part of academia, those below him are Fatah activists, like I said earlier, people who did time in prison. Once there was a meeting on the Palestinian side, for example, and each person introduced himself. It was amazing; a person would say, “My name is so-and-so and I spent 7 years in jail, 9 years in prison, two years.” Every second person has that record, meaning that our field operatives are people who were sentenced to prison because of our security reasons.

What have you learned from working with your colleagues?

You should stop your recording now. I’m going to say a few bad things [laughs]. I learned that the Israeli public is tired and apathetic, and lacks energy. The majority agrees with us, but in general, the term “the silent majority” applies. On the one hand, the public is best described as not doing anything, lacking hope; on the other hand, I met a lot of very good people who believe in this dream and are willing to work for it. That’s why I still believe there is hope, thanks to these people.

I learned a lot about the Palestinian side. I never doubted it before, but I learned just how much they want an agreement. I’m stressing peace less because unfortunately the word has acquired a bad reputation over the past few years. People don’t believe in it, so for instance when I am gathering signatures, I don’t say, “You’re signing a peace agreement,” rather that we’re attempting to reach a settlement, or in other words, a dignified divorce settlement. That’s our line. I also learned that people believe in the necessity of achieving an agreement.

I learned that though we’re now in a difficult period, there is a window of opportunity that is on the verge of being closed. Soon the chance will have passed. I don’t know when this ’soon’ will be, maybe a year or two years, five years from now. I learned that it’s now or never. When people ask me whether I’m optimistic or pessimistic, I say that in Israel people who are right-wing are pessimistic for the short term but optimistic in the long run. People who are left-wing are optimistic in the short term because they’re pessimistic regarding the long run [laughs]. In certain terms I’m neither here nor there, because I’m pessimistic in both the short and long run! [laughs] But someone once said to me that people involved in such a field can’t be pessimists. I’m not really pessimistic. There’s a book by Emile Habibi called The Opsimist, meaning a little pessimistic and a little bit optimistic. That’s me right now.

What’s the most difficult thing for your group to agree on?

The most difficult thing, on the Palestinian side, is the right of return. It’s the most difficult because the right of return is a dream, and what we’re saying is, relinquish it. Relinquish that dream for a more realistic one; that’s the hardest aspect for the Palestinians. They are doing it because they say that the bottom line is that they know it’s a dream too. It’s a strategy for negotiations, but nothing more. At the end of the day we know we’ll need to settle and our estimation is that there won’t be a return. For the sake of the dream of having a state we have to settle.

And does everyone who signs know that the agreement gives up or limits the right of return for Palestinians?

Yes. They must. It’s important to say that Sari Nusseibeh has been openly saying this for the past four or five years. We are arguing about whether they mean it. Yes, anybody who joins this initiative knows he’s going with Sari Nusseibeh and Sari Nusseibeh has decidedly said he relinquishes the right of return. Let’s say that on the Israeli side it’s much less of a taboo. It used to be the issue of Jerusalem, now everybody assumes that Jerusalem will be divided.31 Everybody agrees on the ’67 border.32 The most difficult part for both sides is to give up the dream, or the idea of fulfilling it, the larger dream I mean.

What’s the larger dream that must be given up in order to compromise?

The larger dream is the whole Palestine, the whole Eretz Yisrael.33 That’s the dream, and we are choosing the smaller dream in order to fulfill national rights there.

You said "everybody agrees on the '67 borders." Who agrees--are you referring to the people who sign your statement, or to the two societies in general?

Polls show that the majority of the Israeli and Palestinian publics--70% on each side-- believe that eventually the solution will be a two state solution in which the borders are the '67 borders with minor changes. 100% of those who sign believe that this will be the solution-- otherwise they don't sign.

How far do you think this can go? What are your hopes for this stage, and this project?

My dream is that the Israeli and Palestinian leadership will adopt this document and use it as the framework, saying, this is what we want to achieve. That’s my dream, to reach a settlement.

What will have to happen to achieve that?

More people will join us. It will happen, the more people join us. It’s happening already, people are interested in our initiative. An Israeli politician, sadly enough, isn’t thinking in terms of next year, but rather about tomorrow--how he’ll appear in the newspaper. If he knows that the majority of the public wants it, that’s what he’ll support. We can see it beginning now.

Are you personally satisfied with the agreement?

Yes, I am. I would take it further to say that our hang-up is the right of return. I would be willing to acknowledge that right to a certain extent, but that’s not the point. Who knows if we do reach a peace agreement whether it will be structured identically to our agreement. If you take only the six articles, a single page, we won’t get anywhere. It’s only a frame, and I’m satisfied with it.

You are also involved with the Movement for Realistic Religious Zionism.34 What is that?

This movement is predominantly comprised of young people, religious people, and the Israeli term - national religious,35 from the mainstream of religious society. Some studied at the mainstream yeshivas,36 and what they’re saying is that religious society should shift the focus from being only on settling Eretz Yisrael. It should allocate its resources in new directions and renew itself. Focusing only on the settlements and things of the sort has led us to stagnation.

This movement also has other aspects to it; it criticizes religious education -- other things occurring in religious society -- not only pertaining to politics. Its banner is the settlements. We’ve failed. It’s time to let that go. The movement’s uniqueness is that it doesn’t come from outside, it’s a society that comes from within religious society. Its members don’t consider themselves strangers or outsiders but rather as a part of religious society that is fearful for its fate.

When did you get involved in this Movement?

I joined the Movement when it was officially launched a year and a half ago. At the time I considered linking them with the [Ayalon-Nusseibeh] Initiative. In retrospect, the Initiative became my job and the Movement is my hobby, where I volunteer after work. That’s how I began.

Why did you want to link the Movement for Realistic Religious Zionism to the People's Voice?

I discovered that many people in the Movement for Realistic Religious Zionism had signed the People’s Voice initiative, so the initial obstacle didn’t exist. The second problem addresses the religious person. Usually religious people in Israel relate to a certain party; they are affiliated with the right wing, with the settlers. In today’s demonstrations opposing the disengagement,37 90% to 99% of the participants are religious people.38 It’s important to me to show that there is an alternative, another side to it. When we achieve an agreement, religious Zionism39 will suffer a great blow, and one of its main pillars will crumble: the notion of Eretz Yisrael. That will be the blow. I believe that this movement can soften the blow by preparing religious Zionists and the rest of Israeli society for such a process.

What’s the most important thing for you, as a religious person, to move forward? Is leaving the settlements the focus? Is that enough?

It’s a beginning, the first step. That’s what brought me to the People’s Voice. We came to Israel to establish a democratic Jewish homeland. If we continue to occupy the Territories we will either cease to be a democracy or cease to be a Jewish homeland.40 We will have to relinquish one of the two and I’m not prepared to do that. I think that for us to realize the dream of a democratic Jewish homeland we must exit the Territories, for example. Religious society is led by the extreme factions, which do not acknowledge this idea. That’s why we are saying, “no, there’s a different option.” The biggest problem with religious society is that it’s founded on the notion of community -- it could be a synagogue, friends or neighbors. People don’t feel comfortable speaking out against their community. What we’re saying is that we represent a legitimate part of religious society. We want to legitimize that notion.

How does that connect to the People’s Voice?

It did connect, there were activists there, but the thing is that this movement includes aspects that are not relevant to the People’s Voice. The People’s Voice focuses on its six principles41 while the Movement has other agendas. They voiced their support, joined, signed, but there’s no point to fully merging. The Movement has a social agenda, an educational agenda. The People’s Voice has only the political agenda. That’s the difference.

Regarding the name Realistic Religious Zionism, what do you mean by realistic?

The name is derived from the opposition to messianism.42 We are the Realistic Religious Zionism, which sees reality for what it is.

What do you personally gain from being involved in this kind of work, in both projects?

A great deal of satisfaction. On the one hand I can convince a person that a partner for peace exists and that he or she can sign and join, and on the other showing that there’s a different kind of religious Zionism, and that brings me a great deal of satisfaction. I believe in the necessity of creating a change in Israel, and I believe it must come from below, from the people. Two years ago I never would have thought I’d be here dealing with these issues. It was clear then what I was about to do. I was certain I would be a part of academia, that I’d have my Ph.D. and become a lecturer at the university. That plan changed. Suddenly I’m looking beyond that; I never had considered NGOs.43 Now I know they’re very important, things can’t work without them.

What does your family think about your work?

They’re very supportive.

What about your community?

It varies. There are those who are supportive and those who reject it. Nothing more to report.

Are you hurt by people rejecting your ideas and opposing your work?

Yes, I’m a little disappointed. Not everyone can think the same way though, that would be boring.

How do the Israeli and Palestinian authorities approach the People's Voice?

The essence of our initiative is that we don’t aim to replace the government. We don’t care who gets there--Sharon,44 Barak, Netanyahu45--as long as it happens. For that reason we aren’t perceived as people who are undermining the government, we certainly are clear about not participating in the competition of parties. That’s the first thing. There has been an interest taken in us, because we aren’t political and we have civil support and we come from the people. Politicians from the Israeli leadership are interested in the initiative. The leadership, unfortunately, doesn’t lead the people, but rather it listens to what the people want and heads there. Since that is the case, now they are approaching us and showing an interest. So we aren’t perceived as undermining the government. I think the same applies to the Palestinian society. It’s completely novel there. It’s like that in the Israeli society too, but here we are somewhat accustomed to movements of this kind. There it’s all completely new, and they view it suspiciously. I was in Ramallah at talks with senior officials in the PA to present the initiative. They wanted to hear the Israeli side - they hear Nusseibeh all the time, “let’s hear you now.” That was very interesting. We aren’t perceived as opposition.

The Geneva Initiative46 was criticized for undermining the government.

That’s a big difference between us and Geneva Initiative. The Geneva Initiative presents itself as an alternative to the government, saying, we’ll implement this agreement. Second, they created a peace agreement, which we haven’t; we aren’t drawing up maps. Our approach is that the leadership will decide the maps. I’ll give you a concrete example: There’s the settlement of Alei Sinai47 in the Gaza Strip, situated 50 meters from the border. It is a widespread understanding that there will have to be territorial swaps, so why evacuate Alei Sinai if we can compensate with other territories in the Negev?48 That’s not a decision for me to make, not me or you or anybody, it’s a decision for the leaders to make. We don’t draw up borders, we aspire to achieve a retreat to the borders of ’67 and swap territory as necessary. That’s why we didn’t draw up maps. The Geneva Accords movement drew up maps and that’s why it’s perceived as subversive and much more dangerous. What right do you have signing on behalf of the state? That’s why they’re considered subversive.

The matter of the security forces is interesting. Once we went to Jericho,49 arrived there with our bus. An officer boarded the bus with his orders and before he got off he said, “Just so you know, I signed.” Another story is that Nusseibeh was detained at a checkpoint. One of the soldiers noticed who he was and said to him, “Tell Ami Ayalon I signed, too.” Another story is that one of Nusseibeh’s activists traveled with pamphlets and materials and was stopped at a checkpoint. The soldiers saw propaganda and thought it could be dangerous and called for a translator. The translator came, translated the material and said, “Wow this is great stuff!”

The army is a part of the people in Israel. Army people who serve in the defense forces have also signed, we know this. We know that high-ranking officers say that they can’t sign because of their positions but that they believe in it. “We’ll sign once we’re finished with our army service, we promise.” So we don’t encounter problems with the political authorities or with the security authorities.

Do Ami Ayalon’s connections help?

There were a few occasions, not many. Our power is limited. There are matters in which the soldier at the checkpoint is more powerful than the former director of the GSS. That can’t be helped. On the trip to Jericho there was an incident. We requested a permit only for the bus, and suddenly four of Sari’s activists joined us. It was May or June and it was hot. You could see they were sweating, coming on foot to arrive. We shook hands. They wanted to take a taxi and go to Jericho. They were told they couldn’t, that they had a permit but not the taxi. It was several kilometers from the checkpoint and we wondered how they would get there. [The Soldier] said, no problem, go with the bus! [laughs] He said to them, I can’t let you in except if you go by foot or take that vehicle that has a permit, then it’s okay. That was because Ami Ayalon and the rest of us were there. I don’t know what would have happened had we not been there.

Do you see the disengagement as being an important issue? How do you regard it?

I view it as being negative; it isn’t a wise step. First, it presumes that there is no partner for dialogue, and I believe we have one. Second, the only chance the disengagement has for achieving something good is if it isn’t limited to disengagement. Where will it lead? As a first step with others following it can achieve something positive. As a unilateral step it is a very bad thing in my opinion.

Do you think the damage will exceed the benefits?

Of course! The unilateral disengagement is a victory for Hamas50 and for all extreme factions. The main group in the PLO--Fatah--has been trying for years to prove that we need dialogue with the Israelis to achieve anything. What they’re hearing is, you talked but to no avail! “We’re firing Qassam missiles,51 shooting soldiers, that’s what does the job.” They view it as being a negative step.

As a religious person, can you justify evacuating the Territories? Can you justify it according to halacha [Jewish religious law] or do you feel the need to?

No. In general I don’t see a connection between halacha and retreating from the Territories. There are explanations, but personally I don’t see a connection. The State of Israel is a secular, rather than religious, body. There shouldn’t be a link between policy and halacha. That’s my opinion. Halacha pertains to people; if this country were a halacha state that conducted itself according to halacha, then it would make sense to consider halachic considerations, but it isn’t, so that’s not relevant.

Would a halachic state be preferable?

In theory, I don’t know. I have never considered the matter. A halachic state is a slogan. It doesn’t hold water. You can’t construct a halachic state now--it’s impossible.

Do you think that the National Religious community needs to confront these questions?

It’s interesting that the halachic argument isn’t present in the religious community. The personal aspect, the question of security, the emotional aspect is much more prominent than halacha. I mean, there are adjudicators that favor a retreat and those who don’t. So what? The tool exists for justifying the issue, so it’s not relevant. For the religious community the aspect of security and the aspect of the state’s future are more important than anything else.

Does either the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative52 or the Movement address the issue of the Temple Mount?53

Certainly. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative addresses the issue of the Temple Mount. They say the following: it is a holy site. For Israelis it will always be the Temple Mount, the site of the Temple. This is part of what I mentioned about a process of rehabilitation. For the Palestinians it’s the site from where the Prophet ascended to the heavens and where the mosques are situated. Neither side is ready yet to accept the other’s narrative. This is why the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative says we will waive authority over the Temple Mount, and they will do the same for the Western Wall.54 We say that the authority there will be divine authority. He’s responsible. The Israelis will serve as administrators for the Western Wall and the Palestinians for the Temple Mount. This is the solution; it is a utopian solution, but we must detonate a massive landmine. That’s why we’re taking a different approach.

What is the percentage of religious people who sign on the Israeli side?

11%. That’s been researched. We did a survey recently. I can’t remember the precise data; it’s very hard to determine. Some evidence, we weren’t surprised, shows that 50% vote left-wing, Labor Party,55 Meretz.56 More than 50%. That was foreseeable. But we don’t have an unequivocal profile put together of those who sign. I witnessed it when we toured the country and there was very little resistance and it was very easy to convince people to sign. Once I explained what we were, they signed. Everyone did. There’s no profile for someone who wouldn’t sign. Even settlers have signed, though not many.

How has the conflict affected your life?

It hasn’t much. On a personal level I’m not affected much, I served in the Territories when I was in the army. I don’t live beyond the Green Line;57 I don’t stand at checkpoints.

Do you still do reserve service?

Yes, but not in the Territories.

Do you not do reserve service in the Territories because you refuse to?

No! It’s just not my job anymore. I don’t go there anymore, so it’s not relevant for me. In the Movement for Realistic Religious Zionism we have people who’ve gone to jail for refusing to serve in the Territories,58 not many, but there are some.

What is most important for you to achieve?

My ideal is a democratic homeland for the Jewish people.

What does "a democratic homeland for the Jewish people" mean?

It means I live in my nation state, Israel; it’s my home and can be a shelter for any Jew, and be a democracy at the same time. I want to lead a normal life here in Israel.

Do you think that is contradictory - a democratic Jewish homeland?

It’s not in the political sense. There are problems on the level of religion, but they can be resolved. We have the technical tools. It isn’t a contradiction in my opinion.

Which external agents from abroad can influence the region in a positive manner?

There are many. The EU59 can exert its influence; the United States could change a lot here. There’s a lecturer at Ben-Gurion University60 who says that it’s simple: Israel’s policies are formed by external pressures. Everything is influenced, even legislation in the Knesset61; governments are ousted and established, so maybe it’s very influential.

I believe in the power vested in the people. The problem in Israel is that we haven’t yet internalized the concept of a civil society. We don’t believe in it yet, we don’t understand how much power the people hold. We work with leadership abroad on the initiative. We present it and hope to succeed in organizing a conference of some sort, an international conference that will deal with these issues.

Can you talk a little about previous peace processes and where you think they failed?

The point where we failed is what I talked about earlier. We never discussed the price tag or what we aspired to achieve in the end. We always put things off until the end and there was never any reason to, things should be discussed at present. That’s why we failed, we never talked things through. We never discussed the Palestinian State or what its borders would be. We discussed Jerusalem but things were never upfront, we never said, ”the straight talk is that Jerusalem will have to be divided“. Currents running through the country said this, rather than leadership. That’s the first place where the processes failed.

The next aspect is that talks were always held abroad, in Oslo, Geneva. They should have taken place here, no two ways about it. Talks should have been held here in order to avoid a sense of alienation, and they must not be secretive. The talks were secretive almost throughout the process and then suddenly we got the Oslo Accords.62 It should have been a gradual process, manifest; I mean gradual in the sense of exposure. That’s were I locate its biggest failure.

The failure in general was that you could say we didn’t comprehend the Palestinians and they didn’t understand us. We believed we were entering a process for peace in order to gain security, the Palestinians believed they entered the peace process in order to achieve a state. In 2000 we reached the state where there was neither security for the Israelis nor a state for the Palestinians. Neither side fulfilled its obligations in the agreement.

It’s a very interesting fact that between 1993 and 2000, while everyone talked of peace, traveled to Ramallah and Nablus,63 we never noticed the settler population multiplied. In 1992-3 there were some 100,000 settlers and in 2000 they became 200,000.64 The Palestinians witnessed this and couldn’t believe that we were discussing peace and on the other hand enlarging the settlements. They felt cheated! The same thing happened here. We couldn’t understand how they didn’t operate against Hamas. How could someone be in jail one day then released after two days and then in again? It’s what’s termed the ”revolving door policy.“ The Palestinians didn’t fight terrorism and we didn’t stop settlements.

Do you see any signs that it will be different next time around?

I told you I’m pessimistic. If it happens soon it will be because it is inevitable and not due to good will. That’s why I’m somewhat pessimistic. I’m positive that there are some terms that must exist in order for it to work: the process must be open, it must take place here and we must understand exactly what its toll will be. The people must partake in the process in terms of knowledge and awareness. We have to learn to put ourselves in the Palestinians’ shoes and they in ours. It’s difficult; there are many issues that can impinge. That’s why I’m pessimistic. I have hope-I haven’t stopped working in this field.

There’s something else of relevance here, more for Palestinian society. I’ll introduce it with a story. When I was young and handsome I served in Gaza. There was a watchtower that overlooked the soccer field. There was a game every Saturday, and it was a known fact that the losing side would get angry and throw stones at our watchtower. Why? By the way, if it was a tie there was a 50% chance -- either both teams’ fans stoned us together or they did nothing. Why? They couldn’t fight with each other, so they let loose at the first thing they saw, which was the Israeli Occupation. It’s an interesting phenomenon, but that’s pretty much what happened in 2000. There was a lot of pressure within Palestinian society. Prior to 2000 there were more articles in the Palestinian media that attacked the PA’s corruption than Israel. So the pressure was vented against Israel and not the Authority, because they are brothers.

The classic example is Marwan Barghouti.65 He is currently in an Israeli prison, but we forget that this man was a man of peace, someone who supported the peace processes, a partner in all sorts of projects. How did he suddenly become…he symbolizes the frustration of a certain class in Palestinian society. A class that felt it lost in both the intifada66 and the peace process. The “corrupted outsiders came and took over the finances”, and they vented that anger at Israel. That’s what’s being said today, we didn’t understand that in 2000, and we’re beginning to now. That’s an internal issue for the Palestinians, less an Israeli-Palestinian issue.

What are the roots of this conflict?

I don’t know what the roots are. Some will say a hundred years ago, some will say 1948.67 Others will claim that it all began in 570 upon the birth of Mohammed.68 Some will pinpoint it as starting on account of Abraham exiling Ishmael. I don’t know what the roots are! I don’t have an answer.

Does religion play an important role? Is it your classic conflict among nations?

It’s a nationalistic conflict that assumed religious characteristics; once it becomes a religious conflict there’s no chance because then there can be no middle way, it can only end in the triumph of one religion. Personally, I don’t view the conflict as being a religious one; it’s a proper conflict between nations in the approximately 100 years it’s existed.

What does the word peace mean for you?

It doesn’t have the best connotations. It connotes something very bad. Let’s put it this way: Israelis and Palestinians don’t believe in peace nowadays. It’s a term that we’ve exploited over the past 10 years, and we’ve tainted it. We kept speaking of peace and nothing happened. That’s why when I come to sell the Israeli society my views I don’t talk of peace because then I’d be told, “You’re talking nonsense.“ No, I talk of a divorce settlement. I believe that currently the two societies, Israeli and Palestinian, are ill societies. They are in critical condition, even if peace as it were arrived tomorrow morning and we were to reach a settlement, both societies would have to undergo rehabilitation, painful and difficult. If that’s what happens tomorrow morning then I really hope that my grandchildren will be able to live in ideal peace. But it will take a long time; I’m sure that when it does happen we’ll witness people going here and there but it won’t be a process and it won’t be profound. It will take a long time for us to emerge from this. Peace for me is an ideal I wish we could achieve.

Is there anything you’d like to add?

Maybe just one sentence. In the People’s Voice, our main advantage is that every side works with their people. That’s the mantra. We’re doing it for Israel and they’re doing it for a Palestinian State. They aren’t doing this for the Israelis and we aren’t doing it for the Palestinians. This is a patriotic initiative on the part of Israeli patriots and Palestinian patriots, each looking out for their own national interests. That’s the basis of our uniqueness and also perhaps our success.

In terms of peace processes and peace organizations’ failures, are there any successes to mention? Are there any people or movements that you appreciate, that you consider role models or have made any breakthrough progress?

On the Palestinian side, Fatah is a movement that made a breakthrough in general. If you look at Fatah today, in light of the movement in the 50’s, it’s come a long way, making large-scale changes, and it has succeeded. There’s a beginning of a Palestinian state. Aside from that, Palestinian extra-parliamentary movements are a new concept. There’s nothing to weigh it against. There are movements on the Israeli side that have succeeded; I believe in the drops adding up to become a sea. So one drop is the Geneva Initiative, and the People’s Voice, the conscientious objectors and Anarchists Against the Wall.69 Those drops add up and something will come of it. People always say that Four Mothers70 got the IDF71 out of Lebanon. True, there was a group called Four Mothers, but let’s not forget that Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and withdrew in 2000. There were always protest movements over the period of 18 years. Four Mothers entered the picture at the end and gave the final push. There are groups that succeeded, but it’s very much about timing, when you act. People in Israel aren’t aware of the power of civil action. It’s a new concept here.

You mentioned the conscientious objectors. What do you think their effect is?

I mean generally, without referring to myself, the objectors’ movement is another bumper for halting the Occupation. I’m not saying it’s the most important. I don’t believe in revolutions, I believe in processes that take place gradually. If there are 10, 20 movements, each will contribute its own unique aspect, its touch, and there will be an agreement in the end.

End.



Notes

We have done our best to provide accurate, fair yet succinct footnotes to help you navigate the interviews. Our research team comprises more than 6 individuals, including Palestinians, Israelis and North Americans. Still, we recognize that these notes cannot capture the full complexity of this contested conflict. Therefore, we encourage you to seek additional sources of information, we welcome your feedback and appreciate your openness.

Hadera An Israeli city 60 km North of Tel Aviv. Est. population 75,000.

Givat Haviva An education, research and documentation center, founded in 1949. It is located in the Northern Sharon Valley in Israel. Its primary goal is to foster dialogue towards peace, community work, and education among citizens of Israel. Over 50,000 people take part annually in the seminars, workshops, courses, conferences and other projects offered by the organization. The arts, research, and publications are important components of its activities. See http://www.dialogate.org.il/peace/default.asp

Ayalon, Ami (1945- ) Member of the Israeli Labor Party and also a member of the Knesset and former Israeli Naval commander and former Israeli head of security. He co-authored the People’s Voice Initiative with Sari Nusseibeh. See http://www.hashd.org

Israeli Intelligence Service/Shabak/Shin Bet The Israeli Security Agency, also known as Shabak, Shin Bet, and the General Security Service (GSS), which is engaged in internal security intelligence, as opposed to the Mossad which deals with spying on the international front. Internal in this case means that the service operates within Israel proper and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The service is especially involved in providing intelligence about terrorist organizations.

The People's Voice An Israeli-Palestinian initiative to advance a particular set of principles related to contentious issues to be resolved in any eventual diplomatic peace process. It was begun by Ami Ayalon, a former Israeli official, and Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, a Palestinian professor and the president of Al-Quds University. As of June 2005, 415,000 Palestinians and Israelis have signed the petition in support of those principles. The People’s Voice

1967 Borders Refers to the borders of Israel with Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria prior to the War of 1967. The war is referred to by Palestinians and Arabs as the “June War” and by Israelis as the “1967 War” or the “Six-Day War” on account of its duration. Israel captured the Egyptian Sinai, the Syrian Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, then under respective Jordanian and Egyptian control. See also War of 1967 and Green Line.

Settlement A settlement is a Jewish community usually existing outside the internationally accepted boundaries of the State of Israel. Those ideologically in support of them do not call them “settlements.” The settler movement began following the war of 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, the Golan Heights in Syria, and the Sinai in Egypt. Settlements are most controversial when they are built within the Occupied Palestinian Territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, which some Israelis refer to as Judea and Samaria or as “disputed territories,”—often on land confiscated from Palestinians. Proponents of the settler movement say that settlement on these lands is a divine right, mandated by religious texts, and part of the Zionist imperative to settle Eretz Yisrael or The Land of Israel (see Zionism). Less ideological proponents regard it as a security necessity for Israel. Opponents argue that such settlements are illegal under international law, that they annex Palestinian-owned land, and preclude the final status of disputed borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state. By and large, settlements receive government funding, as well as military and infrastructural support. The course of the separation barrier frequently juts into the West Bank in order to protect Jewish settlements within this territory. In 2005, the Likud government initiated the withdrawal of 8000 Israeli settlements from Gaza and from a handful of settlements in the West Bank. Approximately 135 settlements remain in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), with a population of 419,000 in 2005. See Gorenberg, Gershon. The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements 1967-1977. New York: Henry Holt, 2006. Masalha, Nur Imperial Israel And The Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion (Pluto Press: 2000). See online “Land Expropriation and Settlements.” B’Tselem. 9 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/

Jerusalem Known as Al Quds (“The Holy”) in Arabic and Yerushalayim or Zion in Hebrew. A city located in the center of both Israel and the West Bank portion of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Home to approximately 730,000 people from all three monotheistic religions, as well as sacred sites from these faiths within close proximity, including the Western Wall, the al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The Green Line, or the 1949 cease-fire line between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, demarcates the unofficial boundary between Israel and the West Bank, and divides Jerusalem. Israel immediately declared Jerusalem as its capital in 1948, and enshrined this in its Basic Laws in 1980. Palestinians aspire to declare Jerusalem as the capital of a nascent Palestine. Following the War of 1967, Israel extended its sovereignty to the Eastern half of the city, including the Old City and the holy shrines, which were controlled by Jordan from 1948. Israel “unified” East and West Jerusalem in its 1980 “Jerusalem Law”, leaving borders undefined. Most countries do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the entire city, an opinion codified in UN Security Council Resolution 478. Rather, they regard Jerusalem’s status as undetermined, pending final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. See: “Jerusalem” Kumaraswamy, P.R. Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2006. To read the text of the 1980 Basic Law see Basic Law-Jerusalem-Capital of Israel. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 June 2007.

Right of Return International law enshrines the right of a person to leave and return to his or her country. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Right of Return has two controversial connotations: For the descendants of the 700,000-800,000 Palestinians who became refugees during the period of the creation of the State of Israel, as well as for the Palestinian refugees from the war in 1967, the Right of Return refers to their right to return to their pre-1948 and/or pre-1967 homes and lands and—should they freely choose not to return home—to receive compensation. UN General Assembly Resolution 194 affirms this right but is yet to be implemented. By contrast, under the Israeli Law of Return, the right of return refers to the right of Jews worldwide as well as their descendants, to receive Israeli citizenship and to live as full citizens in the land of Israel. The Law of Return was meant to facilitate the ingathering of Jews worldwide and to fulfill the Zionist aim of creating a refuge in the State of Israel for Jews fleeing persecution and anti-Semitism. For documents relating to the right of return for Palestinian refugees see “Israel, Palestine and the Occupied Territories…” Global Policy Forum. 19 October 2007 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/returnindex.htm. For a text of Israeli Law of Return and its amendments see “Law of Return: 5710-1950” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 October 2007 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law+of+Return+5710-1950.htm

Judea and Samaria Biblical Hebrew terms for the southern (Judea) and northern (Samaria) regions of the West Bank. As official names, they appear on Israeli governmental websites such as that of the Foreign Ministry and the army. In common parlance, they are most often used by Jews who identify with the biblical history of the land, and individuals who support the settler movement.

West Bank Geographical territory located to the west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. Israel refers to it as “Judea” and “Samaria.” It has been under Israeli military control since 1967, although certain powers and responsibilities were transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Oslo process in the 1990s (see Oslo process and Areas A, B and C). The Palestinian population of the West Bank is approximately 2.5 million, in addition to approximately 270,000 Jewish settlers. The West Bank, along with the Gaza Strip, comprises the Occupied Palestinian Territories. See “West Bank.” 1 November 2007. CIA World Factbook. 10 November 2007 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html

Gaza Strip Geographical territory located on the Mediterranean Coast and bordering the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Israel, with a total land mass of 360 sq km. Population: 1,482,405. The Palestinian populated territory was under Israeli administrative and military occupation from 1967 to 1994, when an agreement pursuant to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) gave the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) limited self-government for an interim five-year period, although Israel retained responsibility for external and internal security and for public order of settlements. Until August 2005, approximately 8000 Israeli settlers lived in the Strip. Negotiations aimed at determining final status of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza commenced in 1999, but failed to accomplish their objectives by the second intifada in September 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan to withdraw all permanent military and security structures and dismantle all settlements within the Gaza Strip and return the territory to PNA control was completed in September 2005, although Israel maintains control over air space, and land and sea borders and continues to launch military operations within Gaza. See “Gaza Strip.” CIA. 14 June 2007. The World Factbook. 19 June 2007

As of March, 2005, 253,728 Israelis and 161,000 Palestinians signed the petition. http://www.mifkad.org.il/en/

Fatah ("Al-Fatah") Arabic for “conquest”, Fatah is a reverse acronym for the “Palestine Liberation Movement” (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistani). Fatah is the largest Palestinian political party in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and the dominant faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Founded in Kuwait in the late 1950s by Yasser Arafat to fight for the establishment of a secular democratic Palestinian national state on all of the territory of British Mandatory Palestine. It began paramilitary and political operations in 1964, and assumed the leadership of the PLO in 1968. The organization’s tactics of “armed struggle” especially in the 1970s and 80s, included bombings, assassinations and hijackings in the Middle East, including Israel, and international locations. After Yasser Arafat’s signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in 1993, many Fatah leaders moved from Tunisia to the West Bank and Gaza Strip to serve in the political establishment and security forces of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). During the years of the “Oslo peace process” (1993-2000), the party shifted away from militancy and became identified as the chief proponent of a negotiated, two-state solution. From the launching of the second intifada through to the death of Yasser Arafat (2000-2004), Fatah experienced a split between factions supporting a return to negotiations, and factions such as the “Tanzim” and “Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades” which resumed armed struggle against Israel and claimed responsibility for attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians. This division persists today. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), assumed leadership of Fatah and the PLO after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, and was elected President of the PNA in January 2005. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York & London: Routledge, 2005. See Bowley, Graham. “Al-Fatah.” The New York Times. 20 June 2007. 25 June 2007

According to Addameer, the Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association, since 1967 Israel has detained over 650,000 Palestinians, or approximately 20% of the total Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Activities considered crimes at various points in history included uttering the word “Palestine,” displaying the flag, spray painting political graffiti, being affiliated with activists opposed to Israel’s occupation, or planning to carry out a militant operation against Israel, including bombings, plane hijackings, kidnappings or stabbings. See: http://www.addameer.org/detention/background.html Beginning with the 1987 intifada, Israel developed a pass system to regulate the movement of Palestinians within the Territories and between the Territories and Israel. Former prisoners and activists are given a green identity card, which prevents them from traveling into Israel for “security reasons.” Hass, Amira “Israel’s Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression” Journal of Palestine Studies XXXi no. 30 (Spring 2002) pp 5-20.

Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel Also known as “Palestinian citizens of Israel,” “Palestinian Israelis,” “1948 Palestinians,” or “Arab Israelis.” Refers to those Palestinians and their descendents who remained in the area that became the State of Israel in 1948. They were granted Israeli citizenship. Until 1966 most of them were subjected to military rule that restricted their movement and some of their rights. The tension in Israel between its “Jewish” and “democratic” nature has historically meant that many Arab minority rights have been neglected. According to Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, since 1967, “The state [has] practiced systematic and institutionalized discrimination in all areas, such as land dispossession and allocation, education, language, economics, culture, and political participation.” While their standing in Israel has improved since Israel’s independence, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel experience periodic persecution, felt strongest during the October 2000 riots in which 13 Palestinian Arab Israelis were killed in ten days. In 2004, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel made up approximately 18-19% of the Israeli population. They live within the State of Israel, participate in government and hold Israeli citizenship, but do not serve in the military. See Lustick, Ian S. “Palestinian Citizens of Israel.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005 and Bligh, Alexander, ed. The Israeli Palestinians: an Arab Minority in the Jewish State. London: Frank Cass, 2003. See also Adala and Mossawa online at http://www.adalah.org/eng/ and http://www.mossawacenter.org

For an in-depth examination of identity issues Palestinian citizens of Israel experience, see Rouhana, Nadim Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997 (for a book review: http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss12/benvenisti.shtml)

After Israel took over East Jerusalem, as well as the West Bank in 1967, it expanded Jerusalem’s municipal borders, thereby annexing portions of the West Bank. The Palestinian residents that were absorbed under Israeli rule in the area of Jerusalem were granted Permanent Resident status. After annexation, they were offered conditional citizenship, which they tended to reject for political reasons. The conditions required that citizenship-seekers swear allegiance to Israel and have some command of Hebrew. Permanent residents receive the freedom to travel in Israel, some state benefits, and can vote in local, but not national elections. B’Tselem “Legal status of East Jerusalem and its residents” http://www.btselem.org/English/Jerusalem/Legal_Status.asp

Ami Ayalon, the Israeli director of the People’s Voice (at the time of this interview), was formerly the head of Israel’s General Security Services. Ayalon stepped down from his position at the People’s Voice in the spring of 2005 because of his decision to re-enter the Israeli political arena.

Occupied Palestinian Territories Also known as the “Territories,” “East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza”, the “Occupied Territories” or as “Judea, Samaria and Gaza.” In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this term generally refers to two non-contiguous territories captured by Israel following the war of 1967 (“June War,” “al-Nakba,” or “Six-Day War”), but does not usually include the Golan Heights. East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza are considered occupied by much of the international community and are treated as such by many international legal instruments. The Territories, or some part of, are slated to be the basis for an independent Palestine. Some members of the Israeli government refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “disputed territory,” while certain right-wing factions in Israel consider the territory an integral part of biblical Israel and thus modern political Israel. See “International Law and ‘Occupied’/ ‘Disputed’ Territory Debate” and “War of 1967.”

Ramallah Palestinian city in the West Bank, about 16 kilometers north of Jerusalem. Est. population 40,000. The population of the Ramallah District, including its surrounding 88 towns and villages is 220,000. It is headquarters to the Palestinian Authority.

Tulkarm A city in the Northwest of the West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, population approximately 45,000, the vast majority of whom are Palestinians. The total population of the Tulkarm district is 170,000.

Refers to someone who is wanted by the Israeli General Security Services.

Separation Barrier Also termed the “wall, separation wall, security fence and Apartheid Wall”, and “annexation wall,” by some. A long structure of connected walls and fences that separates Israel from parts of the West Bank, and restricts the movement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel. It runs both along the Green Line and within the West Bank. Critics and proponents disagree over the intent behind the structure, its route, and its name. Begun in 2002 as an alleged reaction to the violence of the second intifada, its construction is still in progress. Israel claims security concerns necessitate its construction, and cite decreases in suicide bombings within Israel since its construction as proof that the structure is both effective and required. Opponents claim the structure is an attempt to annex occupied Palestinian territory and unilaterally define future borders. They also maintain that the route of the barrier steals privately owned land, and makes certain Palestinian villages and cities economically unviable. Israel has modified some of the routes in response to an Israeli High Court of Justice ruling as well as in response to international pressure, but the route is still disputed. The debate over its legality was flamed after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion declaring it a breach of international law. See Kershner, Isabel. Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. For online statistics and analysis see “Separation Barrier.” B’Tselem. 9 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation%5FBarrier/

Checkpoints Roadblocks or military installations used by security forces to control and restrict pedestrian movement and vehicle traffic. The Israeli army makes widespread use of checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in order to control the movement of Palestinians between Palestinian cities and villages and between the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel. Checkpoints can be large and semi-permanent structures resembling simple basic border crossings (such as the Kalandia checkpoint between Ramallah and Jerusalem or the Hawara checkpoint between Nablus and Ramallah) or small, temporary barriers on roadways or outside towns or villages. The security forces at a checkpoint exercise total control over movement through the checkpoint. Depending upon the location of the checkpoint, soldiers may and often do check the identity papers of every vehicle passenger and/or pedestrian who wishes to pass through. At certain checkpoints, mostly those that delineate Areas A, B and C, soldiers refuse passage to all who have not obtained permits from the Israeli military’s Civil Administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestinians and Israeli observers cite frequent, if not routine, incidences of delay and harassment of Palestinian civilians at checkpoints, regardless of the status of their papers. There are currently checkpoints at the entry and exit points of every large Palestinian populated area in the West Bank, on every major road within the West Bank, and at every crossing point on the Green Line between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in addition to many smaller checkpoints within the West Bank. According to the Israeli Army, a checkpoint is a “security mechanism to prevent the passage of terrorists from PA territory into Israel while maintaining both Israeli and Palestinian daily routine,” used to “facilitate rapid passage of Palestinians while providing maximal security to Israeli citizens.” See also “closures” in the glossary. See Keshet, Yehudit Kirstein. CheckpointWatch: Testimonies from Occupied Palestine. London: Zed Books, 2006. For facts, figures, and maps on the web, see “Machsom Watch.” Women for Human Rights. 21 June 2007 and Smith, Chris. “Closure: The Daily Reality of Israel’s Occupation.” Middle East Report Online. 27 August 2001. 21 June 2007and “Restrictions on Movement.” B’Tselem. 21 June 2007

Beilin, Yossi (1948-) A member of the Labor party and a Knesset Member for 11 years. He was Minister of Justice from July 1999 to March 2001. He was instrumental in the early stages of the Oslo peace talks and is one of the authors of the non-governmental, non-binding Israeli-Palestinian Geneva Accord. Beilin is currently the chairman of the Yachad party in Israel. See MeretzYachad online at http://www.yachadparty.org.il/Eng

Rabin, Yitzhak (1922–95) Prime Minister from 1974–1977 and 1992–1995. He was the first Prime Minister born in Israel. He served as Chief of Staff during the 1967 war, following years in the military. He was an active member of the Labor Party from 1973. Rabin was also Defense Minister from 1984–1990 during the first intifada, which he sought to crush militarily. His strategy during that period was characterized by the order for “force, might and beatings.” In 1993, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Rabin took steps toward accepting a future Palestinian state by launching the Oslo Process with the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat. The two shared the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize along with Shimon Peres. He later helped broker Israel’s 1994 peace treaty with Jordan. Rabin was assassinated on 4 Nov 1995 by a Jewish extremist. See Gresh, Alain and Dominique Vidal. The New A-Z of the Middle East. New York: IB Tauris, 2004. See online “Yitzhak Rabin.” Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 18 October 2007 http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9062358/Yitzhak-Rabin

Barak, Ehud (1942-) Israel’s Prime Minister from 1999-2001. Member of the Labor Party. 14th Chief of the General Staff and Lt. General, the highest rank in the Israeli military. He is also the most highly decorated general of the Israeli Army. It is widely held that the Oslo process collapsed definitively in 2000 when Prime Minister Barak and Palestinian National Authority President Yasser Arafat failed to reach an agreement at Camp David. Barak left politics after Likud leader Ariel Sharon defeated him in direct elections for Prime Minister in 2001, but returned in 2004. In June 2007 he won the Labor Primaries, and as Labor leader replaced Amir Peretz as Defense Minister. See Kumaraswamy, P.R. “Barak, Ehud.” Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2006. See online Patience, Martin. “Ehud Barak: Israel’s Comeback Kid.” BBC News. 13 June 2007. 19 June 2007

Nusseibeh, Sari (1949-) Sari Nusseibeh is a professor and President of Al Quds University and former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative in Jerusalem. Nusseibeh is considered a leading Palestinian intellectual and vocal advocate for a non-violent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He co-authored the People’s Voice Initiative with former Israeli security head Ami Ayalon. See “Sari Nusseibeh.” Council on Foreign Relations. 10 September 2007 http://www.cfr.org/bios/9138/sari_nusseibeh.html

Palestinian Authority Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Also known as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA was created to serve as the governing body in charge of Palestinian self-rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as part of the Oslo process. While the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed on to the Oslo peace process in 1993, it has since seen its leadership absorbed into the PA, pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement. As leader of the PLO, Arafat became the PA Chairman in 1994. The Palestinian Authority is the first governing body of the Palestinian people by Palestinians. Its authority was significantly curtailed by the content of the agreements signed with Israel during the Oslo Process, giving it full jurisdiction over only a small proportion of the West Bank (see “Areas A, B and C” in glossary). It consists of a legislative Council and its President, including 24 ministries. Mahmoud Abbas was appointed President of the PA in April 2003, was replaced by Ahmed Qurei months later, and was elected in 2005. The PA has observer status in the United Nations. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority. New York: Routledge, 2005 and Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003. See online “Palestinian National Authority.” Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. 11 September 2007 http://www.un.int/palestine/thepa.shtml

Refers to the idea that Jerusalem should be divided into a Palestinian and an Israeli section, with each section becoming the capital of its respective state.

This refers to the Green Line that divides Israel from the West Bank. The ’67 border also includes the border separating the Gaza Strip from Israel. The two-state solution envisaged by The People’s Voice embraces this border arrangement.

Eretz Yisrael Hebrew, meaning “The Land of Israel,” the term refers to the Biblical Land of Israel, but is used by some to refer to the State of Israel today thus linking it to the religious and geographic Jewish homeland as represented in the Bible.

Movement for Realistic Religious Zionism The Movement for Realistic Religious Zionism was founded in May 2003 by a group of young religious men and women, committed to changing the current image and direction of religious Zionism. The organization has three main goals: ending Israeli control of the territories, reforming religious Zionism’s stance towards women in religious law, and addressing the tension between religious law, modernity and social justice. See their Web site at http://www.tzionut.org/index.asp

National Religious Party (MAFDAL) The National Religious Party, also known by the Hebrew acronym, MAFDAL, is a Zionist, Jewish religious political party in Israel. It promotes Judaism in public spheres (education, marriage, etc.) rather than the separation of religion and state, and believes in increasing a Jewish presence in the biblical Land of Israel through the expansion of settlements. It opposes a Palestinian state within the boundaries of the biblical Land of Israel. See National Religious Party: Mafdal. 2006. Israel Votes 2006- Israeli Democracy in Action. 19 June 2007

Yeshiva A school of Jewish religious study.

Gaza Disengagement Also referred to as “Disengagement,” “the Pull Out,” “the Withdrawal,” “the Evacuation” or “HaHitnatkut” in Hebrew. In the current conflict, this term refers to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal of all 21 Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip and four settlements from a small section of the Northern West Bank in August of 2005. The plan was completed 12 September, 2005 after 949 arrests and 701 detentions of settlers who refused to leave, as well as infiltrators who opposed the plan (approximately 5000-8000 infiltrators in Gaza, and 2100 in the Northern West Bank, confronted security forces during the disengagement). Israel currently maintains control over Gaza’s air space, land borders and coastline, but has no “permanent security presence” within the Gaza borders. In total, despite tremendous internal opposition, some 8000 Gaza settlers were evacuated as part of the plan. See Bickerton, Ian J and Carla L. Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007 and Efrat, Elisha. The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A geography of occupation and disengagement. London & New York: Routledge, 2006. For a text of the April 2004 declaration outlining the plan see “Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.” The Knesset. 16 April 2004. 25 June 2007.

Though this assertion is difficult to verify, several empirical studies lend support to this generally. Research by Professor Arye Rattner, of the Haifa University Center for the Study of Crime, Law and Society, found that 27 percent of the Ultra-Orthodox support illegal actions to block a withdrawal from the territories in 2000. “Goodbye Old Rift, Hello New One” Israel Religious Action Center 7/30/00 http://www.irac.org/article_e.asp?artid=304. The Jerusalem Post reported that “The vast majority of religious Zionist rabbis oppose disengagement. In fact, not one leading rabbi has come out in favor.” Wegner, Mati “Rabbi: Pullout entails 14 biblical sins” Jerusalem Post 2/24/05 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer&cid=1109181979802&p=1078027574097

Zionism The belief that the Jewish people should have a national homeland, and refuge from persecution, in Israel. Supporters of this idea are called Zionists. The Zionist Movement took shape in Europe in the late 1800s with the First Zionist Conference in Basel, Switzerland. The movement advocated the ideology of Zionism, a national liberation ideology of the Jewish people with several strands, foremost being the establishment of a Jewish state within the biblical Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael or Zion). Zionism has many manifestations, from religious to secular, each defining a distinct view of which land should be settled, and how it should be done. See http://www.mideastweb.org/zionism.htm

Daskal is referring to what is often called the "demographic argument" in favor of the two-state solution. That argument reasons that in order to retain both its democratic character and its status as a Jewish homeland (with majority Jewish population), Israel must relinquish control of the West Bank and Gaza.

See the text of the six principles: http://www.mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp

Messianism Movements that base their views on the religious notion of awaiting the Messiah, the king of the Jews, of the promised and expected deliverer of the Jewish people. www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn

NGOs Non-governmental organizations.

Sharon, Ariel (1928-) Prime Minister of Israel, March 2001-January 2006. Member of the Likud Party and later founder of the Kadima Party. Israeli Minister of Defense during the Lebanon War from 1981 to 1983, when he resigned after a government commission found him indirectly responsible for the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Lebanese Christian Phalangist militias. Other positions held by Ariel Sharon include: Minister of Agriculture from 1977-1981, Minister of Trade and Industry from 1984-1990, and Foreign Minister from 1998-1999. Sharon held the position of Minister of Construction and Housing from 1990-1992, which witnessed the most comprehensive expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza since Israel’s occupation of the territories in 1967. While Sharon was referred to by many as the “father of the settlement movement”, he initiated and oversaw the withdrawal of all Israeli settlers from the Gaza strip in the summer of 2005. In November 2005, Sharon, while still serving as Israel’s Prime Minister, quit the Likud Party and formed a new centrist party named Kadima (meaning “forward” in English.) In justifying his exit from the party he helped found, Sharon stated that the Likud Party was no longer equipped to lead Israel nor oversee any future peace deals with the Palestinians. In early January 2006 Sharon suffered a massive stroke, underwent several operations, and is currently in a coma. Following Sharon’s admission to the hospital, powers of the Israeli Prime Minister were transferred to Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004. See online “Profile of Ariel Sharon.” 28 May 2006. BBC News Online. 9 November 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1154622.stm.

Netanyahu, Benjamin (1949-) Member of the Israeli Likud party; recent Minister of Finance in the Israeli Knesset (parliament) but resigned in August 2005 to protest the Israeli withdrawal of settlements from Gaza. Netanyahu had previously served as Ambassador to the UN from 1984-1988, deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1988-1991 and Deputy Minister in the Prime Minster’s cabinet in 1990 and 1991, where he participated in the Madrid Peace Conference and the negotiations in Washington. Elected Prime Minister from 1996–1999. Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Wye River Memorandum – a continuation of the Oslo peace process – in 1998. Netanyahu went on to win the Likud Party Chairman elections in December 2006, obtaining 44.4% of the vote. See Gresh, Alain and Dominique Vidal. The New A-Z of the Middle East. New York: IB Tauris, 2004. See online Benjamin Netanyahu. 10 September 2007 http://www.netanyahu.org/biography.html

Geneva Initiative Also referred to as the Geneva Accord. A nongovernmental initiative launched in Geneva on the 1st of December 2002 by Dr. Yossi Beilin from the Israeli side and Mr. Yasser Abed Rabo from the Palestinian side. The initiative outlined proposed steps and cooperation toward a final status agreement in fields ranging from economics to natural resources as well as the resolution of issues such as settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and Right of Return for Palestinian refugees. The Geneva Accord never gained official recognition, although proponents continue to press for its adoption and implementation. For a full text of the terms outlined in the Geneva Initiative, see the Geneva Initiative website at www.geneva-accord.org

Alei Sinai Located in the northern Gaza Strip.

Negev Desert comprising the southern one-third of Israel.

Jericho A city located in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, east of Jerusalem, with an est. population of 20,000, the vast majority of whom are Palestinians.

HAMAS (Arabic for “zeal” and an acronym for “Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya” or “Islamic Resistance Movement”). Inspired ideologically and organizationally by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and founded in 1987 at the beginning of the first intifada, HAMAS’ long-term and declared aim is the destruction of the State of Israel in order to establish an Islamic state in all of the land of British mandatory Palestine. It is the largest Palestinian militant Islamist group. It uses political, social and militant means to further its goals, and claims responsibility for militant operations, including the use of suicide bombings that have killed hundreds of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The European Union and Israeli and American governments consider HAMAS to be a terrorist organization. Its followers view HAMAS as a legitimate force fighting against Israel’s occupation over Palestinian territories. HAMAS also provides charitable social and educational services, primarily in Gaza. It runs candidates in municipal elections and closed elections for university councils, trade union groups and nongovernmental organizations. The Israeli military has assassinated many of its political and military leaders in the last few years, including the spiritual leader and founder Sheikh Ahmad Isma’il Yassin and political/military leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi. HAMAS’ success in recent Palestinian local elections (January 2005), and its dramatic rise to power in parliamentary elections in January 2006 has led some to speculate that the group is transforming from a primarily militant organization seeking an Islamic state over all of the land of British mandated Palestine to a political party focused on political control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Fatah refused to accept the results of the 2006 elections, causing tensions between the two groups. In July 2007, HAMAS wrested control over all of the Gaza Strip from its main rival, Fatah. Soon after, PA President Mahmoud Abbas dismantled the newly formed unity government that included members of both Fatah and HAMAS, effectively ending HAMAS’ official role in the Palestinian Authority government. See Chehab, Zaki. Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement. New York: Avalon, 2007 and Hroub, Khaled. Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2006. See online “Backgrounder: Hamas.” 2007. Council on Foreign Relations. 29 August 2007 http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/#6

Qassam rockets Free-flight artillery rockets lacking any guidance system produced primarily by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. About 2000 Qassam rockets have been launched into Israel from Gaza since March 5 2002, landing frequently in the southern city of Sderot. The rockets have a maximum 10-15 km range, and have caused property damage as well as occasional infrastructure damage. Israeli defense specialists consider the Qassam rocket to be more of a psychological threat than a physical threat. As of January 2008, at least 12 Israelis have been killed by rocket attacks on Israeli towns or cities along Gaza’s border. See “Gaza’s Rocket Threat to Israel.” 21 January 2008. BBC News Online. 29 January 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3702088.stm

The People’s Voice was commonly known as the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative, until Ami Ayalon stepped down as co-director in the spring of 2005 because of his decision to become involved in Israeli politics.

Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif The Temple Mount, located in the Old City of Jerusalem, refers to the area where the First and Second Jewish Temples are believed to have once resided. The location, known as Har HaBayit in Hebrew, is revered by Jews together with the Western (or Wailing) Wall beside it, which is considered the last remnant of the Second Temple. For Muslims, the area of the Temple Mount is known as the Haram al-Sharif (The Noble Sanctuary) and is what makes Jerusalem the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina. The Haram al-Sharif includes the Dome of the Rock shrine and the Al-Aqsa mosque. Related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and their holy sites has become a major point of contention in negotiations as both Jews and Muslims greatly revere the area. While Israel maintains sovereignty over the site, the Islamic Waqf runs the site on a day-to-day basis. The Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf (“Pious Endowments”) is recognized by Israel as the custodian of the Islamic Holy Sites of Jerusalem, a position that is challenged by the Palestinians. Jordan has been in charge of maintenance of the Haram al-Sharif since 1954. See online “Western Wall.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 29 August, 2007 http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article-9382572

According to the principles: “Neither side will exercise sovereignty over the holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be the Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy site will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent.” http://www.mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp

Labor Party Mifleget Avodah in Hebrew. One of two major political parties in Israel that tends toward the center-left of the political spectrum, it emerged from the labor Zionist movement in the 1930s. Its leaders include many of the principal founders of the State of Israel, including the first Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Founded on socialist and Zionist principles, it dominated the Israeli government until 1977. Labor became the leading Israeli political party favoring territorial compromise for peace, and was the party that first officially recognized the PLO when Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres signed the Declaration of Principles and launched the Oslo Peace Process with Yasser Arafat in 1993. See online “Israel Labor Party.” Knesset. 7 September 2007. http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=0

Meretz Hebrew for “vitality.” A political party considered to be on the left and secular, formed in 1992 with the merger of Shinui, Mapam and RATZ. Officially registered in 1996. In 1997, part of Meretz split to form a separate and more radically left movement. Meretz disbanded in 2003 in order to form a new party, Yachad, which literally means “together,” but is also an abbreviation of “Democrat Social Israel” in Hebrew. Yossi Beilin heads the new party. See Meretz Yachad. 10 September 2007 http://www.myparty.org.il/main-branch/en/

Green Line Refers to the 1949 Armistice Line following the war of 1948. Demarcated unofficial boundaries for the cessation of hostilities between Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Following the 1967 war, it denotes, in most international opinion and UN resolutions, the boundary between territory recognized as part of the legitimate, sovereign State of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Refusenik/Conscientious Objectors Soldiers or reservists in the Israeli army who refuse to serve in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Israeli army altogether are commonly known as (and often refer to themselves as) “Refuseniks,” a term that was first applied to Jews who were not allowed to leave the Soviet Union to come to Israel by the Soviet government. For an Israeli to legally avoid military service based on the grounds of conscience or refusal, one must be granted Conscientious Objector (CO) status. Hundreds of Israelis have refused service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories on moral grounds since the outbreak of the second intifada. Israel court martialed about 280 for the decision. Many serve up to 35 days in jail. The Refusenik movement gained popularity after a group of Israeli reserve officers and combat soldiers drafted the Combatant’s Letter in January 2002, outlining their justification for conscientious objection. See Courage to Refuse. 19 October 2007.

European Union See http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm

Ben Gurion University of the Negev See http://www.bgu.ac.il/

Knesset The legislature of the State of Israel, located in Jerusalem, and consisting of 120 members. Knesset members are known as “MKs.” The Government of the State of Israel must be approved by a majority vote of the Knesset. See the Knesset Web site at http://www.knesset.gov.il/index.html

Oslo Process This process was unveiled with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, although it was preceded by an exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat and back-channel negotiations by Israeli and Palestinian academics. In those letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. The DOP called for a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on United Nation Resolutions 242 and 338. It also led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA or PNA) as part of the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. Yasser Arafat became President of the PNA. A series of agreements between the Israeli government and the PNA followed. The agreements are known collectively as the Oslo Accords. The Oslo process was set back with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. After the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000, it ended with the assumption of the second intifada in September 2000. See Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. Boston: University of Arizona, 2004. See “The Oslo Declaration of Principles.” MidEast Web. 13 September 1993. 11 September 2007 http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm

Nablus A Palestinian city in the northern West Bank. Est. population 132,000.

In 1992, there were 105,400 settlers. In 2000, there were 199,654 according to the Foundation for Middle East Peace, and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. http://bringthemhome.btvshalom.org/Settlers1.pdf

Barghouti, Marwan (1959-) Longtime member of the Palestinian resistance, involved primarily with Fatah. Once a supporter of the peace process following the signing of the Oslo Accords, Barghouti became disenchanted with ties between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. He became a leader of the second intifada and reportedly of Fatah’s Tanzim militia in the West Bank. Israel arrested him in 2002 on charges of heading al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. He is currently serving five consecutive life-sentences in Israeli prison, after being tried on 26 murder charges as well as membership in what Israel regards as a terrorist organization (in 2004). His fate was likely sealed when al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade issued a statement in 2002 naming Barghouti as their leader. He was believed by many to be a contender for the leadership of the PA following Arafat’s death, but finally decided to withdraw his candidacy for the January 9th 2005 elections. He is viewed as a hero by many Palestinians and as a potential political contender in the future. See Fischbach, Michael R. “Barghuthi, Marwan.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005. See online biography at Isseroff, Ami. “Biography of Marwan Barghouthi.” MidEast Web. 21 June 2007

Second Intifada Arabic for “shaking off.” The second intifada is sometimes called the Al-Aqsa (Aksa or ‘Aqsa) Intifada or the Armed Intifada. It refers to the recent Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The second intifada began in September 2000 following the breakdown of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and immediately following Ariel Sharon’s (then, an Israeli opposition leader) police escorted visit to the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif. Sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and their holy sites (including the al-Aqsa mosque). Sharon was highlighting a major point of contention in negotiations as both Jews and Muslims greatly revere the area. There is debate as to whether the second intifada was a spontaneous uprising catalyzed by Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, or a planned revolt by certain Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat. Unlike the first intifada, the second intifada involved suicide bombings and more use of arms, in addition to mass rallies, general strikes and various other strategies. The exact end date of the second intifada is ambiguous. Some claim it is ongoing. See also First Intifada. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004. See online “The second Intifada.” 8 December 2003. AlJazeera.net. November 2007 http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=187 and “Al-Aqsa Intifada timeline.” 29 Sept 2004. BBC News Online. 9 November 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3677206.stm

1948 The year 1948 is often mentioned in reference to a series of historical events that have impacted both Palestinians and Israelis, notably, the war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan (known as Transjordan at the time). 1948 is remembered in Israel as the year of independence and in the Arab world, especially among Palestinians, as Al-Nakba, “the catastrophe.” 1948 saw the establishment of the State of Israel and the continued flight and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the territory previously known as the British mandate of Palestine. For details and sources see War of 1948, Al-Nakba, and Haatzmaut/Independence Day.

Prophet Mohammad Mohammad was the founder of Islam, and is revered by Muslims as the final prophet of God.

Anarchists Against the Wall A loose-knit organization of Israeli activists, anarchists and anti-authoritarians who oppose the construction of the security barrier by participating in demonstrations and civil disobedience.

Four Mothers Movement A feminist grassroots movement begun in 1997 that pressured the Israeli government to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, which it did in 2000. Four Mothers Movement

IDF Acronym for Israel Defense Forces, the State of Israel's military.