« Portrait | Interview Highlights

Interview with Rami Nasrallah

Can you give us a brief background about your life and how you got involved in peacemaking?

I don’t know if I am involved in peacemaking or not. Defining peacemaking work is problematic. I view myself as a person who believes in cooperation with Israeli groups, as they are the ones that control the stability in the whole region. It is not an issue of my belief in peace. I am against approaching the issue of peace as a belief. I think this approach is wrong. In my opinion, peace is not a romantic thing, but a reality that improves the people’s lives on the personal and social level. There is no Palestinian or Israeli who loves peace as an abstract concept. Peace improves people’s standard of living, and this is our aim. I don’t perform my work because I love peace, but rather because this is a Palestinian interest, through which we can change our position as Palestinians, build a democratic society, a strong economy and viability for the Palestinian state. All this can be achieved only through peace. In my opinion, peace is a means to achieve our goal of building a modern and democratic civil society.

Who founded the International Peace and Cooperation Center?

A group of young people founded the IPCC with the goal of creating change according to a Palestinian agenda. We had always expected to receive land, money or help. We never expected our needs or our demands. Appreciative of the significance of Jerusalem,1 we made it our focus. There was never a Palestinian vision for what we wanted in Jerusalem. We don’t know what we want. We had to found a think-tank that deals with the issue of Jerusalem, and even the viability of dialogue with Israel.

Dialogue with Israel should be based on Palestinian interests. When the Israelis initiated meetings in Europe that were funded by the Europeans, the Palestinians sometimes didn’t understand the intent of the meetings and we didn’t ask ourselves the right questions about the relations with Israelis. We were literally followers. This creates extremely negative reactions. Part of the people become “traitors” who work for Israel and part become nationalists who are against normalization.2 Can I free anything from Israel if I don’t meet with the Israelis? I can’t. The idea for the creation of the IPCC was the creation of a Palestinian agenda for the issues of peace, development and social and economic mobility. We would have liked to change the structure of the society, but we focused on the issue of Jerusalem. In the IPCC it was the first time a Palestinian team sat down and produced a number of studies about Jerusalem. Such knowledge is important. We don’t have knowledge. We can’t present the facts of the conflict drawn on a map without knowledge. We should deliver our message in an effective way. The West doesn’t regard our issue as a just, historical one. We should be able to send that message to the world.

How did you choose your Israeli partners?

In the last seven years we have worked with one or two Israeli partners. We didn’t work with everybody. We didn’t accept everybody who had a briefcase and wanted to work with Palestinians. The most important partner concerning the issue of Jerusalem is the Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies,3 because they publish statistics about Jerusalem, therefore we have an interest in working with them. We requested to work with them but they said that they don’t work with Palestinians from Jerusalem because the city is under Israeli control and therefore Palestinians have nothing here. We eventually managed to convince them to work with us. This led to a change. We started talking about an East-West and an Israeli-Palestinian Jerusalem.

There are two kinds of Israeli groups that are interested in relations with the Palestinians. The first kind needs some kind of therapy; they can’t believe that Palestinians are not terrorists, therefore they accept every Palestinian that can speak well. Yesterday I attended a lecture at Tel Aviv University which was attended also by Ran Cohen,4 an Israeli MK, Ziad Abu Zayad5 and Kais Abed, Karim Abu Layla6 from the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).7 We discussed the concept of partnership. Ran Cohen concentrated on the final political solution. Ziad Abu Zayad talked about the reality of the settlements, etc. Abu Layla talked about the Palestinians’ strong desire for peace and the Israelis’ lack of commitment. I said that you [Israelis] shouldn’t look upon us as weak and poor, that we need your help and offerings. We don’t need anything from you.

According to the Israeli mentality they are giving things up in order to give them to us, but these things were already ours to begin with. My principle is that if you don’t want to accept a viable democratic Palestinian state that exists beside the Israeli State, Israel will not exist. It is clear. It is an Israeli interest for the Palestinians to have power and viability. The Israelis are not doing us a favor. The Israelis should understand that in order for Israel to exist the Palestinians should build their state on their own land, a state that is viable and democratic like any other country. Israel isn’t a part of Europe or a part of the US; it is part of the Middle East. The only way to integrate the Israelis into the Middle East is to create a viable Palestinian state. Someone once asked me if there was an Arabic word for peace. I said that this question isn’t worth answering. All the audience clapped hands in agreement when I said this. He said that there are two words for peace: peace and reconciliation. I said that I would not answer this question because the person who asks this question is stupid and arrogant because he claims that he is civilized and yet he underestimates the Arab culture and its peaceful values. These incidents are very important.

There can’t be a solution to the conflict until the Israelis understand that they don’t have to give the Palestinians their rights because they feel sorry for them and because the Palestinians are poor and weak. There will be no solution before the Israelis stop viewing the Palestinians as a demographic threat that needs to be disposed of. The Israelis should abandon the idea of a pure Jewish state and stop trying to get rid of the two million Palestinians that they view as a threat to this state. The Palestinians are a part of the region and a partner. The Palestinians have a part in shaping the region’s future.

How does what happened on the ground affect relations and meetings with the Israelis?

The Israelis aren’t the main thing we deal with. Relations with the Israelis never stopped, even in the most difficult circumstances. We used to meet despite bombings in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv8 or incursions in Gaza.9

Why do you work with IPCC?

I was one of the founders of the organization, and the head of the director's council. The main reason we founded the organization is in order to maintain equal and comprehensive relations with the Israelis; we Palestinians need to strengthen our abilities. We need to reach a certain level of intellect, professionalism and culture in order to be partners with the Israelis. I am not, and will not be a member of an organization that sets peace as its goal. I believe in building our capabilities as Palestinians in order to achieve equality in partnership with the Israelis. This is the goal.

What are the actions you undertake?

The actions focus on putting in place policies for the future of Jerusalem and Israeli-Palestinian relations, not in terms of a peace agreement, but in terms of the impact and implications of the political agreement on the life of Palestinians and Israelis regarding all aspects: social, economic, political, environmental. Peace has become confined to one issue, political agreement. Political agreement will not achieve peace. What will achieve peace is building a system that changes people's lives for the better. Signing papers called the Oslo agreement10 or Camp David11 or Taba12 is not an achievement of peace, but an agreement between political parties. Real peace is achieved through fundamental change and by providing security for Palestinians, and at the same time allowing Israelis to enjoy the benefits of the peace. This did not happen in Oslo. There is a need to distinguish between an agreement and real peace.

What are the peace activities you engage in?

We have no field activities; we are not an activist organization, but a policy organization.We build cooperative relations with Israeli centers in order to study the conflict, its results and its effects. We try to put in place policies for working with the issues of economy, infrastructure, social development, transportation and tourism. We work to formulate policies to ensure peace as a way of life, and not as a negative reaction to the current situation.

What is the nature of your activities?

Most of the work is developing scenarios and policies for relations with the Israelis. We aren’t an organization that exists in order to achieve peace. We are an intellectual team that works on issues related to Jerusalem from an internal Palestinian perspective, with Israelis, and with foreign groups. We work on a project in association with Cambridge University concerning the buffer zones and frontiers between East and West Jerusalem. We are trying to assess the dynamic relations between the two parts of the city. Most of the IPCC's programs try to build a new concept for the relationship.

The main objective for me is the establishment of the concept that we need peace for leverage. A weak partner cannot be a partner for peace. We need to strengthen Palestinian society so it can face a modern and civilized country like Israel equally. We cannot speak of a fair and secure peace without good relations with the Israelis. We are afraid of relations because we don’t believe in normalization, but Israelis themselves don’t want any relations with Palestinians. They created the wall.13 The wall is also a means for mental separation. They don't want to see the Palestinians. People in Kfar Saba14 don't want to see the people in Qalqilia,15 therefore they build an eight-meter high wall.16

The claim Israelis want to have relations with us is wrong. The Israelis depend on not seeing the Palestinians, and the separation is fundamental. We as Palestinians tied the issue of a political solution to the reaching of an agreement. We didn't accept any relations with the Israelis until after an agreement was achieved. This is acceptable, but we shouldn't end the dialogue with the Israeli side. When the communication stops with the Israelis we won't be able to build any bridges for understanding. Therefore we are preparing for the next level of positive cooperation. This can be done only through meetings.

During my experience at the Hebrew University,17 as a Palestinian student from Jerusalem who did not know a word in Hebrew but learned the language and received a PhD, I started to understand who this enemy is. I used to think that the enemy was the soldier that checked my ID at the checkpoint.18 I used to think that the enemy was the settlers.19 I discovered that there is a civilian side to the Israelis that we might reach an understanding with. The time I spent at the university changed my view generally and my perception of the Israelis. We, as Palestinians, really don't know at all who the Israelis are. We know the Israelis as the soldiers at the checkpoints, we know them by the Hebrew words used in the streets, but do we know the Israeli civilian life? No. That was the motivation for building a comprehensive relationship among civilians.

Palestinians aren't inferior to Israelis in any way. Palestinians are capable of maintaining relations with Israel and the Western world, because they have achieved a very high intellectual level, higher than in any other Arab country. We have the ability to build a democracy that is stronger than in any other Arab country. We have the ability to build a civil society that is different from any other Arab country.

How would you explain why you do this work to someone who has no knowledge of the conflict?

I don't do this work for the benefit of Israelis or for peace. I do this for the benefit of Palestinians. The creation of a viable and democratic Palestinian State is a Palestinian interest and an Israeli interest at the same time. I work for the Palestinian interest. The Israeli interest doesn't concern me much. I am not concerned about loving the Israelis, embracing them and living with them in love and friendship. What concerns me is being able to play a part in achieving peace as a way of life. Nobody loves peace because he was born that way, or has romantic feelings towards peace.

According to the polls, most Palestinians, 70 to 80 percent,20 support peace despite the conflict, the bloodshed, the curfews, humiliation at the checkpoints and the hard economic situation. The Israelis support peace by about the same percentage, despite racist mentalities of separation, of aggression and state terrorism. Israelis believe in peace, but there is a difference between believing in something and realizing it. We don't seek peace as a romantic concept, we seek practical solutions that have benefits and build bridges for peace. This is mainly an internal Palestinian issue. We can't achieve peace without a strong civil society, a free economy, universities, research and normal life.

We and the Israelis are neighbors; one living in a posh villa with a swimming pool and guards, and the other living in a situation worthy of animals. The average annual income for an Israeli is about 15 thousand dollars, while a Palestinian earns no more than 17 hundred dollars.21 The poor neighbor will always try to steal from his rich neighbor. In this situation there can be no peace. If the Palestinians don't reach the same level as Israelis, there will be no peace. My work aims to strengthen the Palestinian side on all levels. When we started working in Jerusalem, we met people who felt inferior to Israelis. We have the feeling that the Israelis are subcontracting the Palestinians. The Israeli peace activists approach peace as a kind of mental therapy. They say “Ah, there is a good Palestinian.”

I believe that all Palestinians want peace, stability and security. At the same level I believe Israelis want peace. It is not an issue of good against evil. Today all Palestinians are accused of terrorism, including myself. When I go to a checkpoint I am treated as a terrorist. I am not treated as a person who wants peace. This situation must be changed. We try to look at the conflict from a different perspective. Not to deal with the ethno- national conflict as such, but to look at the urban fabric and the dynamics of life, which are related to the conflict. We try to focus less on the causes of the conflict and try to come up with futuristic ideas about how to deal with the obstacles, which can prevent achieving peace. Stopping these obstacles from taking control over the whole process is the crucial issue. Signing a political agreement doesn't mean achieving peace.

If you look at the whole spectrum and all aspects of peace, which include the economy, politics, society, and culture, and act and try to deal with these issues and come up with practical solutions, I think this will contribute positively to the building of peace. I differentiate between peace building and peace making. Peace making is an agreement with elites. Peace building is engaging the majorities on both sides to benefit from peace as a way of life, and as something that can contribute to them on a collective level and on an individual level.

What are your next activities as an organization?

Our next activities try to look at the issue of youth as bearers of change. There are three generations among Palestinian society. One generation is the traditional nationalistic generation of leaders. This generation still has the revolutionary culture; it is not able to build the civil culture that will help us as Palestinians to build our society, economy and democracy. The second generation is the one that lived under the Israeli occupation. This generation is aware of democratic values but is still influenced by the traditional leadership, because there is no political solution. They are reluctant, in a way. They can't move forward because there is no solution to the political dispute. This causes them not to move from the revolutionary mentality to the more civil mentality. They are stuck in between the national movement and state building. This generation sometimes uses violence in order to provide legitimacy to their leadership. Because there is a struggle and occupation, fighting the occupation is a legitimate act by the Palestinians. This approach belongs to the revolutionary mentality.22 There is a third generation that I am afraid will follow the first and the second. I am afraid they will not be able to think about the future, and will use the same methods as the first and second generations. We have to avoid this. We have to provide this generation with the tools to use their energies in a positive way, not a negative one. We can fight and kill the Israelis, they can also kill us, but this will not contribute to our state building and social democracy building.

What we are trying to do now, as the IPPC, is to engage them in learning by a process in which they are aware of their role and contribution to the social, economic and political mobility. We try to empower them to be democrats, because democracy can't be taught. If you are an architect you should know how to use architecture to create change. If you come from the field of communications and media, you should know how to use your profession as a tool for change. The same is true for all the other professions. We are trying to bring all the young Palestinians together in order for them to establish their own agenda for change. Reforms will not come only from initiatives, because initiatives often have interests to national community partners like the initiative of the greater Middle East,23 for example, which is important. Those who are going to carry out changes are the people themselves. Without establishing the capacities to bring change, nothing will happen. At the same time we use professional scientific methods like scenario building in order to determine the best and worst case scenarios. According to this we try to develop strategies of intervention.

If we want to change the Palestinians’ situation, we should rethink what peace contributes to the Palestinian cause. We should reconsider the whole behavior of our leadership. The second and third generations I mentioned should be more critical. We should not attack the leaders, but we should have a say about bringing in new ideas and concepts and bringing in fresh ideas that should come from inside Palestinian society and not be imposed by outsiders.

We mostly focus on Jerusalem and planning strategies for the city. We are also starting dialogue with Israelis who are not left-wingers but are more from the mainstream about how to make Jerusalem a capital for two countries. It should be a city without a wall separating it into two cities. Jerusalem can never have the international importance without the Palestinian existence. The more positive relationships we can establish between the two sides, the more effective the international role will be because this city is of importance for all Christians, Muslims and Jews, the Western world and the world as a whole.

The other thing we are working on now is the role of media in contributing to the image of the other. How can media play a positive role in implementing change? It is about the public agenda for the Palestinians because the conflict turned us into a society that is incapable of organizing its agenda or priorities. Sometimes we just blame it all on occupation, but we should also work on our internal agenda. Occupation does play a role, but that's not all-- this is what we are trying to highlight through media.

We are also studying the image that we have of the West, Israel and anyone that falls under the title of “the other.” Working on conflict resolution means we have to acknowledge that the conflict is not only political, but also social, economic and educational, regional and local. We need to figure out how to deal with all these conflicts within a single framework. Political conflict could be solved but the educational, intellectual, conflict will continue to exist, so the region should be in synch to be able to work it out. The civil society is one of our biggest concerns; we work with a lot of NGOs24 inside Palestinian society in order to clear the Palestinians' vision and figure out the different scenarios to implement change.

We keep thinking about occupation and its consequences, but we don't think about the ways that we can change it. For example, if Sharon25 got crazy one day and decided he was going to give us the West Bank26 and Jerusalem back, what would we do with it? This is our main concern: what is our role as Palestinians once occupation is over and how can we be prepared.

What are the biggest challenges you face?

The biggest challenges are daily mobility and facing the occupier. It is hard for me to face the Occupation every day and see the power of the Occupation. This situation raises an important question for me: why am I doing this when a 19-year-old soldier can close a checkpoint and punish hundreds of people? The reality of the Occupation is the toughest thing I am facing on a daily basis.

Did you ever have doubts about your work or doubts about doing the right thing?

I didn't have doubts about my work itself; I had doubts about the timing. Sometimes I have a feeling that we are not prepared, as Palestinians and Israelis, for a historical compromise. Each side, especially the Israelis, has its interests as terms of reference before reaching an agreement. They are scared of demography,27 they want to keep occupying the land and that's why they want to pull out of Gaza,28 not because they want a real peace process. With this mentality of building walls and eliminating a threat, we will not have peace. They consider us a demographic and terrorist threat. They accuse us of not belonging to the area. Their solution is to build a wall.

This doesn't mean that our principles are not relevant. Our point of view is still relevant, we should invest more effort into making sure that what we need happens. We have no other choice as Palestinians. Either we build our viable and democratic state on the areas occupied on the 4th of June 1967,29 or we will continue fighting and killing each other for another hundred or two hundred years.

Did your involvement in this work come as a surprise to you?

No, it was a continuous process. I was in charge of the Israeli relations at Orient House30 and I was an advisor for Faisal Husseini31 on Israeli affairs for many years. I became close to Israeli decision makers, social activists, NGOs and to people in the field of civil society. This is part of what I did since I graduated from the Hebrew University, therefore my work is part of a cumulative process. I am not here because I have no other choices. I have many choices. I perform my work because I believe in what I do. My main work is with the Palestinian parliament, with Abu Ala.32 I am the director of the Jerusalem department.

Was your involvement with Israelis surprising for your family and friends and what does your community think of it?

I think this is a silly question because if you are part of a community you serve the community. I am not doing my work as a stranger to the community. Your question was structured as if what I was doing is a crime and not accepted by the community. The whole point of view of your question is unacceptable for me as a Palestinian. The way the question is formulated is already a judgment. I am involved in hundreds of things. I am involved first of all with my people and not with Israelis. We have interaction with the Israelis and the international community. We have many international partners from the US, Europe, NGOs and political organizations-- therefore it is a wide partnership in which the main thing is not the Israelis. Peace will not only depend on the Israeli side. It will depend a lot on the international community.

How has your involvement in your work changed your life?

It did not change much. I am still a Palestinian. I feel that I am more patriotic as a Palestinian. I have a message to deliver to the Israelis, and I have a message to deliver to my people also.. I am not confused about my work. The problem of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that we talk internally and externally to the other side in two different languages. This creates even more problems. People who are engaged in dealing with the Israelis are more extremist when it comes to internal issues. I don't like this. Either you believe in what you are doing, or you don't do it.

Is it rare in your community to be involved in the conflict in this way?

I think we should deal with the conflict based on a cost benefit approach, and to assess how we are dealing with the conflict and the resolution of the conflict. We consider our interests as Palestinians, which don't contradict the Israeli interests. Our interests are according to our needs as Palestinians, not according to the needs of the Israelis. Peace should be based on the real interests of the Israelis and the Palestinians. Until now the only agenda for peace was the Israeli one. Oslo was based on Israel subcontracting security. Oslo was a double bureaucracy; when you went to a border crossing, you gave your passport to the Palestinian police whose only authority is to give it to the Israeli authorities behind the scenes who made the decision as to whether you could pass or not. This is not peace. We should be able to make our own decisions about our political identity, and not do the job of the Israeli occupation. The result is that the Palestinian Authority33 today, during the whole reoccupation of the Palestinian territories, did not force Israel to take responsibility for services for the people. It has become a free occupation. They enter the Palestinian cities, occupy and kill, but they do not take responsibility for providing anything! They leave it up to the Palestinian Authority to pay for health, education and all the services while we are under occupation. This is an open occupation and is the result of Oslo.

Why did you choose to do this work and not trust the leadership to take care of the situation?

The leadership is not able to think of creative ideas about how to make a just peace. They know what to demand but they do not know how to build systems to achieve peace. Part of my duty is to think of the system. Peace is a whole system. Everything should work together in an integrative way. Economy, education, democracy, culture, trade, infrastructure, etc., should work together smoothly as a part of a peace agreement. The leaders are responsible for signing the agreements and we should find ways to implement them. Peace agreements will not tell us how to do it, rather what piece of land we will get. I assume that if we get all that we demand, we will ask the question, “What are we going to do with what we achieved?” I want to answer this question, irrespective of when the Israelis are going to leave us to establish our state in all the areas occupied in 1967.

What is the personal price you pay for doing this kind of work?

I think none. Even under very difficult circumstances like suicide bombings none of the meetings with the Israelis were canceled. In the same way, when the Hebron massacre34 took place I was sitting in a conference that we organized with Israelis about the wasted opportunity of western tourism to the Holy Land. We didn't cancel the meeting. We are doing our work under very tough conditions, and we are aware of this. No single incident will affect me because otherwise I wouldn't believe in what I am doing.

What do you consider a small success?

When I talk openly and Israelis hear my voice. This is a small success for me.

Have you met people during your work that you wouldn't have met otherwise?

No, I had a chance to meet the Israelis before I started doing this job. I meet people from the whole of the Israeli political spectrum from the right wing, through the middle to the left so I know and meet everyone. I don't like to work with a certain group that is marginalized by their society. I would like to hear the voice of the majority of the Israelis whether I like what they are saying or not.

Can you tell us more about that period when you worked at the Orient House?

I have mixed feelings about that period. The PA was strong but the issue of Jerusalem started to deteriorate, and it became obvious that it would be taken care of last. After the election of Netanyahu35 in 1996 the Palestinian activities in Jerusalem were restricted and the Israeli forces surrounded Orient House. All the activities related to the PLO36 in Jerusalem were prohibited. The Israelis consolidated their control over Jerusalem by investing in police stations in East Jerusalem.37 The Israeli agenda was forced on the Palestinian part of the city.38

Another main issue during that period was the issue of the settlements. Despite all the appeals, the Abu Gnaim settlement was founded.39 In 2000 big roads were constructed that divided the city.40 For example, Road Number One, Road Number Four and the tunnel road. There wasn't only domination and control of the Territories; the Israelis started to use the road system as a means of control. This reduced the possibility of reaching a solution in which Jerusalem is the Palestinian capital. I think we neglected to try to understand the Israelis.

Understanding them doesn't mean we have to love them. I don't want to love the Israelis or for them to love us, but there are interests. If we are strong as a society and as an economy, we can be part of the equation, if we are not strong we can't. Therefore what attracted me was how to learn from the Israelis how to build myself, how to enhance our collective intellect and qualifications and how to deal with issues not only based on sentimental considerations. Their return to this land was not based only on sentimental values; they had a complete agenda. Regardless of how this agenda affected me and of the tragedy it caused the Palestinians, it was an effective program. If we want to deal with the Israelis as equal counterparts we can't do it without absolute knowledge of the Israeli side. I am a Palestinian that had the chance to study at the Hebrew University and to deal with Israelis. I am informed about the economic political and social dynamics of the Israeli society. I felt I had to present the situation to the Palestinian leaders and politicians.

Our view of the Israelis is not always accurate. We sometimes view the bombings inside Israel as part of the liberation of Palestine. The Israelis don't see it that way. The Israelis view a bombing in Tel Aviv not as an operation to liberate Jerusalem or Ramallah,41 but as a threat to their existence. It is important that we understand the Israeli fears, mentality and interests. It is important that we understand the Israeli considerations while making decisions, so that we can deal with these decisions in a better way and not base our reactions on sentimental motives that lead to nothing. The biggest change I experienced is the understanding of the other side. The Israeli society isn't a sealed fortress; it is like any human society in the world. It may have internal debates and different streams, but it is a society that succeeded in building itself in record time and putting itself on the regional map in an incredible way. We should learn from the Israelis how to build a society, a state and an economy. The Israeli economy is valued at $120 billion.42 This is more than the economy of all the Arab countries combined!43 We can use the conflict as a means of strengthening ourselves.

How can the conflict be a source of strength?

There is an ongoing conflict, and we need to establish ourselves as strong people economically and socially. We can't build a national movement without institutions. The existing Palestinian institutions don't have a connection to the people. The PA or the government is totally separated from what is happening on the ground. We didn't manage to build something that unites the Palestinians. Our economy has collapsed in the last ten years. We didn't manage to build our economy and focus on how to strengthen ourselves. We focused on how to deal with Israel through negotiations. Without being strong politically, economically and socially there is no hope for a Palestinian State.

Many people are interested in being involved in work related to peace. Sometimes they don't know who to talk to, where to start or who to work with. What is your opinion?

This is another example of the lack of understanding of the other side. The balance of power on both sides should be obvious. Both Palestinians and Israelis make mistakes in choosing the right people to work with from the other side. The mainstreams on both sides are the base. There is no alternative to relations between the two mainstreams. I can have relations with a nice Israeli academic who speaks well, but that will not change anything. You need to work with the two mainstreams, and the mainstreams on both sides are totally not involved. This is a problem. Therefore the change will have to happen to the majority.

How can one start?

You should start with knowledge. There are three interconnected equations. Knowledge changes attitudes. Attitudes change images. Knowledge about the other side changes the image of the other side. It is very important to strengthen this equation. We sometimes draw conclusions about ourselves without having sufficient knowledge required. We sometimes create attitudes that limit us because we don't have sufficient knowledge. This is true also about the Israeli side that treats us as an enemy. The Israelis should value knowledge. Today most of Israelis who have knowledge of the Palestinians are associated with the peace camp. A major part of the Israeli peace camp is based on Israeli interests. They still believe in their cultural, intellectual and technological supremacy. Every person should acquire knowledge about the other regardless of his agreements or disagreements with him. Peace, in the end, is a political issue that is tied to a political solution. There was equality in the Oslo agreement but it was partial. The reason for this is that the agreement was achieved between small political elites from the two sides. Did this have a positive effect on the Palestinians or the Israelis? The answer is no. Peace is a way of life. You are committed to peace according to the effect peace has on your life. On the personal level people should acquire knowledge about the other side in order to promote peace. On the collective level it is hard to progress without a political solution.

What are your expectations for the next five or ten years?

I don't want to be pessimistic but I think there won't be a big change in the next five years. Peace still depends on the interest of the Israelis and has no relation to the Palestinians' interest. The Israelis control the situation and their interests are the motives behind all their actions, like the withdrawal from Gaza. The Israeli interests also determine their policies concerning the control of Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Jordan valley.44 We have no relation to the equation, therefore I am not very optimistic. If Israelis don't reach an understanding that peace should be built according to the interests of the two sides, the only progress will be the unilateral actions taken by Sharon and his successors. There might be a withdrawal from Gaza or a part of the West Bank, but is this the solution? Of course it's not.

What are some learning curves you encountered with your work that others can learn from?

I can't mention anything specific. One of the mistakes may be that we should have worked more with the ordinary and simple people. These people won't read the books and the reports about our visions and so on. We should approach them with something they can relate to. We should work more on involving the community.

Is that a special project you are referring to?


The project is about the planning and development of Jerusalem as a capital for two countries.
We held meetings with the people and got them involved and there was a participatory approach to the planning, but we should work more on the dissemination of information and the creation of public awareness inside the Palestinian community. We shouldn't only work on the level of creating policies, options and scenarios for the decision makers or the international community or the donors or others, we should also work with the people. This is what we changed recently. We are trying to create a connection with the people.
We talked to the simple people, but not all of the people are literate and can read. We have a problem about how to involve the people. People hardened and have lost hope. Therefore when you present them with a cluster of opinions they say, “Leave us alone, we want to find food to eat first.”This is a failure, but not our failure. This is a failure of the society as a whole.

What are ways of involving the people?

We should build hope. The people should start dreaming about what they want.

End.


Notes

We have done our best to provide accurate, fair yet succinct footnotes to help you navigate the interviews. Our research team comprises more than 6 individuals, including Palestinians, Israelis and North Americans. Still, we recognize that these notes cannot capture the full complexity of this contested conflict. Therefore, we encourage you to seek additional sources of information, we welcome your feedback and appreciate your openness.

Jerusalem Known as Al Quds (“The Holy”) in Arabic and Yerushalayim or Zion in Hebrew. A city located in the center of both Israel and the West Bank portion of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Home to approximately 730,000 people from all three monotheistic religions, as well as sacred sites from these faiths within close proximity, including the Western Wall, the al Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The Green Line, or the 1949 cease-fire line between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, demarcates the unofficial boundary between Israel and the West Bank, and divides Jerusalem. Israel immediately declared Jerusalem as its capital in 1948, and enshrined this in its Basic Laws in 1980. Palestinians aspire to declare Jerusalem as the capital of a nascent Palestine. Following the War of 1967, Israel extended its sovereignty to the Eastern half of the city, including the Old City and the holy shrines, which were controlled by Jordan from 1948. Israel “unified” East and West Jerusalem in its 1980 “Jerusalem Law”, leaving borders undefined. Most countries do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the entire city, an opinion codified in UN Security Council Resolution 478. Rather, they regard Jerusalem’s status as undetermined, pending final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. See: “Jerusalem” Kumaraswamy, P.R. Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2006. To read the text of the 1980 Basic Law see Basic Law-Jerusalem-Capital of Israel. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 19 June 2007.

Normalization Refers to the process of creating ‘normal’ relations between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors. Egypt was the first to normalize relations in 1979, with Jordan following in 1994. Normalization prior to the creation of a Palestinian state is viewed by many Palestinians and their supporters as a betrayal of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Egypt was expelled from the Arab league immediately after signing a peace treaty with Israel. The Arab Peace Initiative is the most comprehensive offer of normalization by the Arab world, under the condition of Palestinian statehood, although many parties on both sides view normalization with tremendous skepticism. See “Arab Peace Initiative” In glossary. Israeli and Palestinian groups or individuals willing to work with their counterparts toward a solution to the conflict, on an official or grass-roots level, are often accused of normalization. For a critical Palestinian perspective of normalization see Ibrahim, Nasser and Michael Warschawski. “The case against Palestinian normalization with Israel.” Alternative Information Center. 4 September 2007. 10 September 2007. For a critical Israeli perspective of normalization see Avineri, Shlomo. “The Arab Summit II: Normalization? Israel has seen it and it doesn’t work.” International Herald Tribune. 27 March 2002. 10 September 2007. For a stance supportive of joint Israeli-Palestinian work, see Isseroff, Ami. “A Strategy for Peace: Support Israel and Palestine.” MidEast Web. 29 June 2001. 10 September 2007.

http://www.jiis.org.il/

Knesset member and a Meretz party leader who served briefly as the Minister of Industry and Trade.

Ziad Abu Zayad (b. 1940) Palestinian Legislative Council member and Minister for Jerusalem Affairs. Abu Zayyad engaged in early talks with Israeli leadership during the Oslo and Madrid peace talks along with Faisal Husseini. He is currently a co-editor of the Palestine-Israel Journal. See the Palestine-Israel Journal at http://www.pij.org/ and http://middleeastreference.org.uk/palbiograph.html#ZiyadAbuZiyad

The current leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its offshoot, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), combine Arab nationalist and Marxist-Leninist ideologies. They advocate the creation of a secular democratic Palestine as a precursor to a broader revolution within the Arab world. Founded in the late 1960s by George Habash, the PFLP became the second largest faction within the PLO after joining in 1970, but withdrew its membership with the launch of the Oslo Accords. The PFLP uses both political and militant means—notably hijackings and political assassinations—to advance its aims. In 1994, the Israeli military assassinated its leader, Abu Ali Mustafa (successor to George Habash). His successor, Ahmad Saadat, was imprisoned by the Palestinian National Authority (PA or PNA) following pressure by Israel for the October 2001 assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister, Rechavam Ze’evi. The PFLP’s current leader is Ahmed Jibril. See Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003 and Nigel Parsons. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York & London: Routledge, 2005. See online “Backgrounder.” 31 October 2005. Council on Foreign Relations. 18 October 2007 http://www.cfr.org/publication/9128/

Tel Aviv-Jaffa An Israeli city on the Mediterranean Sea, about 64 km west of Jerusalem. Est. population 350,000.

Gaza Strip Geographical territory located on the Mediterranean Coast and bordering the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Israel, with a total land mass of 360 sq km. Population: 1,482,405. The Palestinian populated territory was under Israeli administrative and military occupation from 1967 to 1994, when an agreement pursuant to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) gave the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) limited self-government for an interim five-year period, although Israel retained responsibility for external and internal security and for public order of settlements. Until August 2005, approximately 8000 Israeli settlers lived in the Strip. Negotiations aimed at determining final status of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza commenced in 1999, but failed to accomplish their objectives by the second intifada in September 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s plan to withdraw all permanent military and security structures and dismantle all settlements within the Gaza Strip and return the territory to PNA control was completed in September 2005, although Israel maintains control over air space, and land and sea borders and continues to launch military operations within Gaza. See “Gaza Strip.” CIA. 14 June 2007. The World Factbook. 19 June 2007

Oslo Process This process was unveiled with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, although it was preceded by an exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat and back-channel negotiations by Israeli and Palestinian academics. In those letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. The DOP called for a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on United Nation Resolutions 242 and 338. It also led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA or PNA) as part of the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. Yasser Arafat became President of the PNA. A series of agreements between the Israeli government and the PNA followed. The agreements are known collectively as the Oslo Accords. The Oslo process was set back with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. After the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000, it ended with the assumption of the second intifada in September 2000. See Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. Boston: University of Arizona, 2004. See “The Oslo Declaration of Principles.” MidEast Web. 13 September 1993. 11 September 2007 http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm

Camp David An American presidential getaway in Maryland. In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, two significant events took place at Camp David, often referred to as Camp David I and Camp David II. At Camp David I (September 1978), Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin reached a bilateral agreement, with assistance and pressure from American President Carter, in which Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for recognition and peace with Egypt, thereby establishing a precedent for “land-for-peace” negotiations. The Agreement called for talks between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Palestinian representatives to create a framework for negotiations regarding the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This goal was never met. Camp David II refers to the last Oslo process-related meetings between Yasser Arafat, Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton in the summer of 2000 over “final status” issues such as the settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood, the rights and entitlements of Palestinian refugees and more. Negotiations broke down and no agreement was reached. The collapse of the process was followed shortly thereafter by the second intifada. See Swisher, Clayton E. The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story of the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process. New York: Nation Books, 2004, Sher, Gilead. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001: Within Reach. London & New York: Routledge, 2006, Shamir, Shimon and Bruce Maddy-Wetzman, eds. The Camp David Summit-What Went Wrong? Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005 and Malley, Robert and Hussein Agha. “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors.” New York Review of Books (August 9 2001), pp 59-65, online at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380

Taba An Egyptian Red Sea resort town just across the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai border, Taba was the meeting place for several peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, including the Taba talks (January 2001), which were considered by many to have produced the most comprehensive and viable proposal for a final status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Its conclusions remain unimplemented. For analysis see “Deconstructing the Taba Talks.” Settlement Report. 11.2 (2001) 9 November 2007 http://www.fmep.org/reports/vol11/no2/04-deconstructing_taba_talks.html

Separation Barrier Also termed the “wall, separation wall, security fence and Apartheid Wall”, and “annexation wall,” by some. A long structure of connected walls and fences that separates Israel from parts of the West Bank, and restricts the movement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel. It runs both along the Green Line and within the West Bank. Critics and proponents disagree over the intent behind the structure, its route, and its name. Begun in 2002 as an alleged reaction to the violence of the second intifada, its construction is still in progress. Israel claims security concerns necessitate its construction, and cite decreases in suicide bombings within Israel since its construction as proof that the structure is both effective and required. Opponents claim the structure is an attempt to annex occupied Palestinian territory and unilaterally define future borders. They also maintain that the route of the barrier steals privately owned land, and makes certain Palestinian villages and cities economically unviable. Israel has modified some of the routes in response to an Israeli High Court of Justice ruling as well as in response to international pressure, but the route is still disputed. The debate over its legality was flamed after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion declaring it a breach of international law. See Kershner, Isabel. Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. For online statistics and analysis see “Separation Barrier.” B’Tselem. 9 November 2007 http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation%5FBarrier/

Kfar Saba A  town in Israel, northwest of Tel Aviv. The majority of its population are Jewish Israelis.

Qalqilia Palestinian City located in the Northwest of the West Bank, bordering Israel along the Green Line. The city is encircled by the separation barrier. Est. population 45,000.

The separation barrier is eight meters high at Qalqilia. Brilliant, Joshua "Over 'The Wall' both sides urge peace" Washington Times 7/16/04 http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040716-011204-9324r.htm

Hebrew University Hebrew University is in Jerusalem. It currently has over 22,000 students.

Checkpoints Roadblocks or military installations used by security forces to control and restrict pedestrian movement and vehicle traffic. The Israeli army makes widespread use of checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in order to control the movement of Palestinians between Palestinian cities and villages and between the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel. Checkpoints can be large and semi-permanent structures resembling simple basic border crossings (such as the Kalandia checkpoint between Ramallah and Jerusalem or the Hawara checkpoint between Nablus and Ramallah) or small, temporary barriers on roadways or outside towns or villages. The security forces at a checkpoint exercise total control over movement through the checkpoint. Depending upon the location of the checkpoint, soldiers may and often do check the identity papers of every vehicle passenger and/or pedestrian who wishes to pass through. At certain checkpoints, mostly those that delineate Areas A, B and C, soldiers refuse passage to all who have not obtained permits from the Israeli military’s Civil Administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Palestinians and Israeli observers cite frequent, if not routine, incidences of delay and harassment of Palestinian civilians at checkpoints, regardless of the status of their papers. There are currently checkpoints at the entry and exit points of every large Palestinian populated area in the West Bank, on every major road within the West Bank, and at every crossing point on the Green Line between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in addition to many smaller checkpoints within the West Bank. According to the Israeli Army, a checkpoint is a “security mechanism to prevent the passage of terrorists from PA territory into Israel while maintaining both Israeli and Palestinian daily routine,” used to “facilitate rapid passage of Palestinians while providing maximal security to Israeli citizens.” See also “closures” in the glossary. See Keshet, Yehudit Kirstein. CheckpointWatch: Testimonies from Occupied Palestine. London: Zed Books, 2006. For facts, figures, and maps on the web, see “Machsom Watch.” Women for Human Rights. 21 June 2007 and Smith, Chris. “Closure: The Daily Reality of Israel’s Occupation.” Middle East Report Online. 27 August 2001. 21 June 2007and “Restrictions on Movement.” B’Tselem. 21 June 2007

Settler Refers to a Jewish Israeli living in a settlement – a Jewish community in the Occupied Palestinian Territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and, before the 2005 “disengagement”, the Gaza Strip. The settlements, established following Israel’s capture of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in the war of 1967, are widely recognized as illegal under international law. See Settlements, Settlement Blocs and Settlement Subsidies.

According to a poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip conducted between March 10-12, 2005, 84% of Palestinians support a "return to negotiations." 59% "prefer a permanent, rather than interim agreement." http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p15a.html#head1

According to the United Nations, the average income of Palestinians is less than Rami estimates: The "average income [of] Palestinians fell from $1,750 a year in 1999 to $1,040 last year. Overall, 72 percent of Palestinians live below a poverty line of $3.60 a day." Fowler, Jonathon "U.N.: Most Palestinians live below poverty line" Associated Press 9/30/04 http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=5006&CategoryId=12 According the World Bank, Gross National Income per capita is $1100 in the West Bank and Gaza and $16,240 in Israel (2003). http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GNIPC.pdf

Khaled Abu Toameh wrote about "a sharp dispute between representatives of the grassroots younger generation and veteran Arafat loyalists who returned from Tunis in 1994." Rami appears to be describing the same political division. "Palestinians turn out in droves for municipality elections" Jerusalem Post 5/5/05 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1115259514951

Rami seems to be referring to an initiative to democratize the Middle East. Though it comports with stated US foreign policy, it also matches the conclusions of the UN's Arab Human Development Report, as well as numerous NGO's in the region. http://www.csis.org/europe/040305_LewisSummary.pdf

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

Sharon, Ariel (1928-) Prime Minister of Israel, March 2001-January 2006. Member of the Likud Party and later founder of the Kadima Party. Israeli Minister of Defense during the Lebanon War from 1981 to 1983, when he resigned after a government commission found him indirectly responsible for the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Lebanese Christian Phalangist militias. Other positions held by Ariel Sharon include: Minister of Agriculture from 1977-1981, Minister of Trade and Industry from 1984-1990, and Foreign Minister from 1998-1999. Sharon held the position of Minister of Construction and Housing from 1990-1992, which witnessed the most comprehensive expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza since Israel’s occupation of the territories in 1967. While Sharon was referred to by many as the “father of the settlement movement”, he initiated and oversaw the withdrawal of all Israeli settlers from the Gaza strip in the summer of 2005. In November 2005, Sharon, while still serving as Israel’s Prime Minister, quit the Likud Party and formed a new centrist party named Kadima (meaning “forward” in English.) In justifying his exit from the party he helped found, Sharon stated that the Likud Party was no longer equipped to lead Israel nor oversee any future peace deals with the Palestinians. In early January 2006 Sharon suffered a massive stroke, underwent several operations, and is currently in a coma. Following Sharon’s admission to the hospital, powers of the Israeli Prime Minister were transferred to Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. See Hartley, Cathy, ed. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations, 2nd ed. London and New York: Europa Publications, 2004. See online “Profile of Ariel Sharon.” 28 May 2006. BBC News Online. 9 November 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1154622.stm.

West Bank Geographical territory located to the west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. Israel refers to it as “Judea” and “Samaria.” It has been under Israeli military control since 1967, although certain powers and responsibilities were transferred to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Oslo process in the 1990s (see Oslo process and Areas A, B and C). The Palestinian population of the West Bank is approximately 2.5 million, in addition to approximately 270,000 Jewish settlers. The West Bank, along with the Gaza Strip, comprises the Occupied Palestinian Territories. See “West Bank.” 1 November 2007. CIA World Factbook. 10 November 2007 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html

Demography-- a term used to denote the ethno-religious make-up of the population-- is at the center of a national debate about the State of Israel's Jewish character. Conferences and councils convene to discuss this issue. Galili, Lily "A Jewish demographic state" Haaretz 6/27/2002 http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=181001

Gaza Disengagement Also referred to as “Disengagement,” “the Pull Out,” “the Withdrawal,” “the Evacuation” or “HaHitnatkut” in Hebrew. In the current conflict, this term refers to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal of all 21 Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip and four settlements from a small section of the Northern West Bank in August of 2005. The plan was completed 12 September, 2005 after 949 arrests and 701 detentions of settlers who refused to leave, as well as infiltrators who opposed the plan (approximately 5000-8000 infiltrators in Gaza, and 2100 in the Northern West Bank, confronted security forces during the disengagement). Israel currently maintains control over Gaza’s air space, land borders and coastline, but has no “permanent security presence” within the Gaza borders. In total, despite tremendous internal opposition, some 8000 Gaza settlers were evacuated as part of the plan. See Bickerton, Ian J and Carla L. Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007 and Efrat, Elisha. The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A geography of occupation and disengagement. London & New York: Routledge, 2006. For a text of the April 2004 declaration outlining the plan see “Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.” The Knesset. 16 April 2004. 25 June 2007.

Technically, the war actually started June 5, 1967. Palestinians refer to it as the "June War" and Israelis call it the "Six-Day War" on account of its duration. Israel captured the Egyptian Sinai peninsula, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the rest of pre-1948 Palestine, comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- then under respective Jordanian and Egyptian control, which have subsequently come to be known as the Occupied Territories. Israel claimed to be acting in anticipatory self-defense from an impending Arab attack. (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War)

Orient House The Orient House is in East Jerusalem and served as the headquarters for the PLO in East Jerusalem. The Israeli government accused the Palestinian Authority (PA) during the Oslo Process of functioning out of the Orient House in an attempt to expand Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. The Israeli government closed Orient House in August 2001, seizing files and computers. See Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. Boston: University of Arizona, 2004.

al-Husseini, Faisal (1940-2001) Palestinian leader who was active in Fatah, the largest PLO faction after 1967, as well as numerous other organizations including the Arab Studies Society, the Higher Islamic Council and the Orient House. Husseini was long engaged in protesting Israeli occupation, which resulted in travel bans, imprisonment, and administrative detention by successive Israeli governments. He was the first prominent Palestinian to hold talks with a senior Likud politician (Moshe Amirav) in Sept. 1987, and was instrumental in launching the Madrid Peace Process. As PLO representative to Jerusalem, he became one of the most active members of the Palestinian leadership engaged in promoting Palestinian-Israeli dialogue in the 1990s. See “al-Husseini, Faisal.” Palestinian Personalities. June 2006. PASSIA. 29 August, 2007 http://www.passia.org/index_pfacts.htm

Qurei, Ahmed (1937-) also known as Abu Ala, Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority (September 2003-February 2006). Qurei, a long-time member of Fatah and numerous PLO bodies, formerly served as the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) from 1996-2003 and was one of the leading Palestinian negotiators in the secret talks that led to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. He has also served as the Minister of Economy and Trade and Minister of Industry in the PNA. Yasser Arafat appointed Qurei Prime Minister after the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas in September 2003. Qurei tenured his resignation due to internal security chaos in July 2004, but Arafat rejected the call. Qurei withdrew the resignation after gaining control of some security forces, but stepped down as Prime Minister after Hamas’ election victory in February 2006. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York & London: Routledge, 2005. See online “Ahmed Qurei.” Encyclopedia of the Orient. 18 October 2007 http://lexicorient.com/e.o/qurei_a.htm

Palestinian Authority Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Also known as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA was created to serve as the governing body in charge of Palestinian self-rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as part of the Oslo process. While the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed on to the Oslo peace process in 1993, it has since seen its leadership absorbed into the PA, pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement. As leader of the PLO, Arafat became the PA Chairman in 1994. The Palestinian Authority is the first governing body of the Palestinian people by Palestinians. Its authority was significantly curtailed by the content of the agreements signed with Israel during the Oslo Process, giving it full jurisdiction over only a small proportion of the West Bank (see “Areas A, B and C” in glossary). It consists of a legislative Council and its President, including 24 ministries. Mahmoud Abbas was appointed President of the PA in April 2003, was replaced by Ahmed Qurei months later, and was elected in 2005. The PA has observer status in the United Nations. See Parsons, Nigel. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority. New York: Routledge, 2005 and Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003. See online “Palestinian National Authority.” Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. 11 September 2007 http://www.un.int/palestine/thepa.shtml

Goldstein, Baruch/Hebron Massacre An immigrant from Brooklyn and follower of the late ultra-right wing Meir Kahane, Goldstein opened fire on Palestinian Muslims during Friday prayers, February 25th, 1994, in the Ibrahimi Mosque [Tomb of the Patriarchs], a site which is holy for both Muslims and Jews. He killed 29 people before being subdued and killed by the worshipers themselves.

Netanyahu, Benjamin (1949-) Member of the Israeli Likud party; recent Minister of Finance in the Israeli Knesset (parliament) but resigned in August 2005 to protest the Israeli withdrawal of settlements from Gaza. Netanyahu had previously served as Ambassador to the UN from 1984-1988, deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1988-1991 and Deputy Minister in the Prime Minster’s cabinet in 1990 and 1991, where he participated in the Madrid Peace Conference and the negotiations in Washington. Elected Prime Minister from 1996–1999. Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Wye River Memorandum – a continuation of the Oslo peace process – in 1998. Netanyahu went on to win the Likud Party Chairman elections in December 2006, obtaining 44.4% of the vote. See Gresh, Alain and Dominique Vidal. The New A-Z of the Middle East. New York: IB Tauris, 2004. See online Benjamin Netanyahu. 10 September 2007 http://www.netanyahu.org/biography.html

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, has long been the umbrella group that includes numerous Palestinian political, professional, and trade groups, all dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In 1969, Yasser Arafat, representing al-Fatah, the largest fedayeen (see “fedayeen” in glossary) militia group in the PLO, became chair of the organization, a position he held until his death in 2004. The umbrella group was the first of its kind among Palestinians, and united disparate factions and organizations in a unitary cause, namely the establishment of a Palestinian state. The PLO carried out numerous international attacks against Israelis in the early 1970s as well guerilla operations aimed at Israel and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. They operated from bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The PLO first gained international legitimacy when Chairman Yasser Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly in November of 1974 and the organization was granted observer status to the United Nations. It signed on to the Oslo peace process in 1993, and has since seen its leadership absorbed into the Palestinian Authority (PA), pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement. While the PLO Charter of 1968 did not recognize Israel’s right to exist, the Charter was amended in 1996 following the Oslo Accord Declaration of Principles (DOP). The amendment to the Charter voided “those articles which denied Israel’s right to exist or are inconsistent with the PLO’s new commitments to Israel following their mutual recognition.” See Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003, Bickerton, Ian J and Carla L. Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 5th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007 and Hamid, Rashid. “What is the PLO?” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 4, No. 4. (Summer, 1975), pp. 90-109. See online “Palestine Liberation Organization.” Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. 11 September 2007 http://www.un.int/palestine/theplo.shtml

This observation is consistent with stated Israeli policy: "The government, at the recommendation of the ministerial committee for Jerusalem affairs, decided to allocate over the coming four years the sum of 130-million New Shekels (approximately 40 million Dollars) annually to improve the infrastructure in the eastern part of the city. The Mayor has repeatedly declared that if we wish our right to sovereignty over a unified Jerusalem to be recognized and respected, we have the moral duty to be concerned about Jerusalem's population without bias and to provide an equal level of services for all parts of the city." http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1998/7/Building%20in%20Jerusalem

Peace Now surveys at the time showed that Netanyahu's strategy was "to strengthen Israel's hold on Jerusalem." Trounson, Rebecca "Israel's Pullout Decision, in Reality, Is Only Theory" Los Angeles Times 12/3/97

The Israeli settlement Har Homa was built on Jebel (mountain) Abu Gnaim. According to the BBC, Israel's construction of this settlement near Jerusalem brought about a breakdown in meaningful dialogue between the two sides. http://www.bbc.co.uk/politics97/news/07/0722/mideast.shtml

On Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, plans for the roads Rami show the intent of the "Ring Roads." Officially, they are to direct mobility to and within the city. The eastern ring of roads encircles the city. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1998/6/Jerusalem%20Urban%20Development%20-%20Urban%20Projects%20and%20F Israeli professor Jeff Halper wrote about how roads and other structures serve the purpose of control: http://www.radioislam.org/historia/zionism/216_halper.html

Ramallah Palestinian city in the West Bank, about 16 kilometers north of Jerusalem. Est. population 40,000. The population of the Ramallah District, including its surrounding 88 towns and villages is 220,000. It is headquarters to the Palestinian Authority.

According to the CIA World fact book, Israel's Gross Domestic Product is $129 billion. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html

Measured by GDP, this claim Rami makes should not be taken seriously. Egypt and Saudi Arabia's GDPs are each over $310 billion - nearly $200 billion more each. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html

The Jordan Valley It is where the Jordan River runs and flows into the Dead Sea. It overlaps with parts of Israel proper, the West Bank and Jordan. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jordan_Valley